(no subject)
Monism and Experience: Solving the Problem of Induction with the Argument from Nothing
Over two centuries ago, a brilliant philosopher and Englishman, David Hume, drew attention to a grave danger befalling the sciences- a logical misstep in the justification for conjecturing about future objects and events. The issue has drawn great debate amongst philosopher and the rolling of eyes from their scientific counterparts- it has been formalized and named the Problem of Induction. What Hume pointed out in one of his many seminal works, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, was in his own words that “all inferences from experience are based on the assumption that the future will resemble the past and that similar powers will be combined with similar sensible qualities” (17). This would be fine and rather unproblematic were it not for the result the assumption produces- it plunges the argument into a discomforting circularity: if we try to prove this assumption (that the future will be like the past) by probable arguments we shall obviously be going in a circle, taking for granted the very point that is in question (16). For further clarity, what is meant in these passages is that the argument asserts its conclusion as one of its premises. Take for instance the famous example of the argument for the sun rising tomorrow. One might argue that in the past the sun has always risen and therefore in the future the sun will probably rise, but this is incomplete. As Hume pointed out, the inference from experience is based on the assumption that the future will resemble the past. Now restate the argument with the underlying assumption or hidden premise and it appears as follows: in the past the sun has always risen, the future will resemble the past; therefore, in the future the sun will probably rise. The circularity is now evident- the conclusion that in the future the sun will probably rise is merely a restating of a particular incident of the generalized second premise that the future will resemble the past. And so we are got into a bind. Hume’s solution to the problem was that the philosopher should rarefy his expectations: The best way for us to avoid such an embarrassment is not to claim too much in the first place and even to find the difficulty for ourselves before it is brought against us as an objection. In this way we can make a kind of merit even of our ignorance (14). Scientists, on the other hand, have merely turned a blind-eye- one can imagine the scientist asking, “Why worry about the heady philosophical stuff when these predictions work so well?” Perhaps, they are right. Perhaps, the truth or the certainty of the matter is irrelevant to any function it may provide, but like the moral philosophers have responded to the impossibility of obtaining moral perfection, I should inquire as to the reason there should not be any attempts. Certainly, there have been some and it is a popular opinion that they have failed. Likewise might I, but I refuse to let this deter me. Even if I am doomed to failure, even if I am met with cruelty and rejection upon analysis from my peers and critics, I can only hope to steer the dialogue into a new direction. While I may not reach my destination, I hope that this argument may clear the way for future work to do so. It is in this vein of unnerving optimism that I put forth the following argument.
Recall that Hume mentioned proving the assumption that the future will resemble the past with probable arguments will inexorably result in circularity. In this point, one can easily see that he is correct. The focus of this work, then, should avoid arguments from probability- that is to say, they should avoid induction. The alternative one is left with, then, is deductive argumentation. It would be a tremendous irony to solve the greatest plague of empiricism with a priori reasoning defined as that reasoning done independent of experience when experience and experience alone begets reasoning. Thus, the work should more precisely be defined in respect to consistency with Hume’s thoughts on the operations of understanding, namely, it should be a work of association of ideas. Its negation should involve a contradiction; its fruit should be got purely by thinking. The maneuver will avoid particulars; it must demonstrate the nature of that which is most general and in doing so envelop those particulars within it. To put it metaphorically, it will not brave an insurmountable mountain by climbing it, but by cleverly moving around it. This is not to say that this argument will succeed in this, but that any argument which does would possess these qualities. The whole of my argument can be summarized as this: by ascertaining some kind of knowledge of what must be one can infer the necessity of causation and if causation is necessary then the future should resemble the past in virtue of its nature though it may disagree in respect to its incidents. To restate this in more concrete terms, thinking on what is will necessitate causality, which, in turn, will lend one justification on which to conjecture about the future. For fear that this is still painfully abstract, I should suggest that its clarity may be revealed in the succeeding sections and as for criticisms that may arise claiming that the totality of this project has relapsed into already failed Rationalist undertakings, I should reply that one, this work is not possible by any means prior to an idealized and yet false conception of some analysis preceding experience and two, that this work is not claiming to know the totality of metaphysical truth, but to delineate its skeleton and leave the Empiricist in a more favorable and justifiable position to know its body.
Philosophy has taken great pains to discover the nature of reality or metaphysics, perhaps in some circles being misled to believe that it is knowable in whole and in others that it is not knowable at all when proof of our existence and limits of our understanding undermine both positions. Likewise, it has yielded much disagreement about where to begin. Certainly, it would be a mistake to think reality begins with a single proposition when it is only men’s minds that do so, but it would be an equal error to dismiss a single proposition as revealing no meaning at all or that its consequences were not of great importance. Still, I should reiterate the mistake many philosophers have made in armchair wrongly inferring that their thought is a capacity in a vacuum and their knowledge inherent. A living, thinking thing only has experience. One could surely not claim that thought, in itself, is not an experience. It seems philosophers of this sort have conflated capacity and knowledge. Capacity of course begins before birth. If it didn’t, it would seem that no one would ever be able to do anything, but this is not to say that it is knowledge of how to do something. Infants are capable of walking, but they must first crawl and move before they truly learn how to walk. Still, I should be careful to differentiate this and the opinion of some Empiricists that human beings begin clean and unscathed when nature has imparted instinct upon us. Namely, these instincts are the capacities mentioned- the inclination to fill them with knowledge. Nevertheless, there is something more fundamental which permeates the opinions of both of these sorts of philosophers and its logical consequences if rightly sorted are no small matter- particularly, that there is something.
This fact, which is so obvious that it has often been overlooked or disregarded, is more telling than that which it plainly claims to affect. It speaks volumes of its opposite and rather counter intuitively reaches back and gives reason more than it had hoped to bore. That there is something means that there is not nothing. A further analysis of the impossibility of nothing may prove even more revealing. The impossibility of nothing entreats questions of its meaning. In answering these, I should say that nothing signifies nothing ontologically. To use Kripke’s terms, it designates nothing. Semantically, its meaning only emerges as the negation of every other designator or every other term that designates an object-a referent- that could or does exist. Settling the issue of the meaning of nothing, however, is insufficient to prove anything about anything. The consequence of the impossibility of nothing, on the other hand, is not insufficient. If there is no such thing as nothing, then, there is no void and if there is no void then there must at least be one, infinite thing. It must be infinite by virtue of the impossibility of nothing. This is because if it wasn’t, then, it would have a limit and there would be a border between it and nothing, which is absurd. Furthermore, there can be only one truly infinite thing. If there were more than one infinite thing, then, there would be a limit on the infinities- namely, that one could not be the other thing. This would suggest that it is not infinite, which is a contradiction.
From these inferences, one can come to the metaphysical skeleton I have hinted at it in the preceding sections. If there can be only one infinity and there must be at least one thing because there cannot be nothing and that thing must be infinite, then, there is one thing and that thing is infinite. This is because if there were many things and together they stretched to infinity, then, they would constitute the infinite thing. As there can only be one infinity and the many things constitute it, then, the many things must be understood as one thing.
In this argument, I have succeeded at my first aim, discovering what must be, and though I have done so oddly, by virtue of what must not be, I see no philosophical dilemma in strangeness alone, but I have yet to prove my second and more important aim and that it is showing that causality follows from the nature of reality. To do this, I must first elaborate on the definitions of the things that constitute the argument from nothing. I have already taken care to clarify the meaning of nothing by virtue of its impossibility in designation and now I should take equal care to clarify the meaning of an infinite thing. It is commonly understood and accepted that by infinity, one means endlessness. Thing is equally straightforward- a thing is a noun or an object, a referent. The fruit of the term, however, is got by understanding the relationship between these two concepts. If infinity means endless and thing means object or designation then an infinite thing can clearly be understood as the endless referent. The consequence of this understanding, however, by no means necessitates causality. On the other hand, if thought is returned to nothing, then, our power is greater. Recall that from the impossibility of nothing one can infer the void is nonsensical and equally impossible, if not entirely synonymous, and that from the argument from nothing one must understand reality as an endless referent. By virtue of our very existence and experience or participation in reality, one, without much deliberation, knows that there are many things that just as well exist. Reality, demanding that one understands it as one, infinite thing, or monistic infinity, necessitates that these things, which exist as we do, be understood as parts of a whole. If one is to correctly understand reality as this monistic infinity then one is forced to identify relationships between its parts. This is because there can be no gaps or voids- nothings in other words- between the parts. This is to say that each part must be in constant continuity with every other part and this constant continuity amongst the parts is what is commonly called causality. To extrapolate further clarity from all of this, I will restate the preceding argument this way: Corroboration of our experience and the consequence of the argument from nothing, namely reality understood as the endless referent or monistic infinity, demands one understand the parts of the monistic infinity as being in constant continuity- that is, they necessitate a relationship between each other.
Still, more must be said on the issue of constant continuity and how this can be understood as what is accepted as causality. It seems possible that though the parts of the endless referent are no doubt in constant continuity, they may still lack in capacity to affect one another. If this is true, then, further explanation is required to demonstrate the parts’ power to cause what the old philosophers called accidents. I should no doubt treat this matter, but I must also first claim that this need not be the case. One part may lack in capacity to affect one another and yet causality is still not lost. In this endless referent, isolation by definition is a contradiction. The notion that one part should, by itself, cause an accident in another is totally absurd. But this, I think, is not sufficiently getting at the heart of the problem. Whether one part or many parts is capable of causing an accident in another is still the matter at hand. However, a more thorough analysis of what is by meant constant continuity should erase this dilemma- in other words, the problem is misleading. It is not possible to conceive of constant continuity where the parts of an endless referent fail to affect one another. If they did fail, they would not be in constant continuity. One can think of the example of color. Take red and add light to it and it results in pink. Certainly red cannot become pink by virtue of itself, but this capability has already been levied against- in an infinite thing, there is no isolation. The notion that red cannot become pink, by virtue of its properties alone, by no means undermines the concept of causality.
The subsequent effect of this argument in regards to the original task at hand, justifying the assumption Hume discussed that the future should resemble the past, is now more plainly evident. The argument from nothing necessitates the understanding of reality as an endless referent and because our existence and thought permits the actuality of parts, one is forced to conclude that the parts are in constant continuity. The failure of this constant continuity would violate the nature of the endless referent. Therefore, causality will never cease. This is not to say that certain predictions or conjectures about future events will always succeed. Above, I mentioned that the future will resemble the past in virtue of its nature though it may disagree in respect to its incidents. This is the best corroboration of philosophical analysis and what science claims to know. Particulars, such as Hume’s example of the rising sun, may fail, but generalities, such as causality, are necessary in that they follow from the nature of reality. For instance, the physicist claims that the sun will rise tomorrow and everyday then on until it explodes. This is an example of a disagreement in respect to its incidents- past experience of the rising sun is insufficient to prove that the sun will rise tomorrow, but this is not to say that predictions regarding the sun’s rising or impending explosion are unjustified. Causality is perfectly warranted as a result of the argument from nothing and the corroboration of part/infinity constant continuity. The particulars will be settled by the empiricist and they are justified so long as they are based on observation, experimentation, and cautious analysis. Their philosophical basis need not be a meek inductive argument grounded in the past, but a result of necessity derived from deductive reasoning. The gap between these particulars and the ultimate nature of reality may never be entirely settled, but this is not to say that it cannot be settled at all. If the argument from nothing succeeds, then, as I have suggested, the skeleton of metaphysics has been established. It is up to the Empiricist to understand its body.
Certainly, there seems to be more to reality than its infinity or constant continuity, but never did I claim to attempt to settle metaphysics in its totality. What I have claimed and have attempted, pending its success, is atoning for the philosophical plague of empiricism and justifying the action of the persons practicing it. The success of this matter as I have also suggested is dependent on the reception and analysis from my peers. In anticipating some potential objections, I will elaborate on some ideas that may be considered flawed or concerns of fact that may appear to undermine the argument.
The first objection lies in respect to the first premise of the argument from nothing. One might claim that nothing is in fact possible and that its impossibility might lie in an epistemic inconceivability, but that it is nonetheless ontologically possible. The error in this objection is so tremendous, it borders comedy, but it is still worth considering. If one were to claim that nothing does in fact exist, then, they would have spotted or demonstrated it in some place in reality. If one could point to nothing, then, it would it not be nothing- it would be a thing, a something or to remain consistent in terminology, a referent. A second and related, but more serious and laudably empirical objection involves a vacuum. Though empiricists have yet to construct a true vacuum attempts have improved upon each previous attempt, and one could reasonably argue that in the foreseeable future scientists will construct a true vacuum, void of all particles of matter. This is often a goal of particle physicists and I will not argue that in the future scientists may indeed succeed in this endeavor; however, there remain a number of both philosophical and scientific problems with concluding that the vacuum is indeed a nothing. First, the vacuum can only be constructed in space. Even if a true vacuum were constructed, it would still not be a nothing- it would be pure space, which is still a referent. Secondly, even if the scientists succeed in eradicating every particle of matter out of the vacuum, it would nonetheless still be filled with things- namely, one would still observe vacuum fluctuations, which regardless of their cause are still things. More probably, the vacuum would be constituted of dark energy or even dark matter. Dark energy and dark matter alike, though, they undoubtedly are not particles of matter in a traditional sense, are also still referents. Therefore, even in the face of a success in particle physics regarding the construction of a true vacuum, claims involving the actual existence of nothing fail both philosophically and scientifically. If these claims fail, then, objections of this sort are insufficient to reject the initial premise of the argument from nothing- the impossibility of nothing.
A second objection may lie in respect to the conclusion from the impossibility of nothing, that there must be an infinite thing. One might claim that they accept the impossibility of nothing, but believe that deriving the endless referent is a non sequitur. In other words, one might say that yes, there is not nothing, but the something that does exist need not be infinite. I must admit, I have difficulty conceiving how this would be so. As I detailed in the argument from nothing, if nothing is impossible, then, there must be one infinite thing because if it were not infinite there would be a border between it and nothing, which is absurd. This seems to me rather obvious. A related objection, or perhaps in reduction it is the same objection, is that emergence or the creation of things is a good reason to believe that the nature of reality is not infinite- it may be perennial, but it is not infinite. I find this much less convoluted and I consider it a serious objection. In response, I should say that the emergence of novel entities or properties by no way derails the infinite nature of reality. For instance, one can consider a set of infinite numbers and then derive the square root of any of those numbers, say for example, the square root of two. Surely, the square root of two or any other number is an emergent property out of that number, but this is not enough to detract from the sets infinity. A more concrete example would be the beginning of our universe. By virtue of the theory of cosmic inflation, physicists have been able to demonstrate the immense likelihood that somewhere in a field preceding the emergence of the universe the conditions were just right for a given particle to begin expanding and subsequently result in our current universe. Still, the universe never came out of nothing. Philosophically, one could even consider that the Big Bang was not the beginning of our universe, but a major event, if not the most major event, in the history of the universe. This makes perfect sense given the consequence of the argument from nothing, or the infinite nature of reality- there should be no absolute beginning to anything. To confront the objection more straightforwardly, one might even say that there is nothing which emerges that has not come from something else. If anything, emergence is merely an epistemic matter; ontologically all that arises is merely a matter of change in the preceding entity or the construction of new relationships between entities, the same way the mathematician can derive the square root from a number already existing in an infinite set. There’s no doubt, at first glance, that emergence seems to be a major problem in concluding that reality has an infinite nature, but after some deliberation the matter seems resolved.
Another objection, which also deals with the result of the impossibility of nothing, or the infinite nature of reality, is a purely philosophical one. The same way that I have claimed that there can only be one infinity because if there were more than one then they would not be infinite by virtue of the limitation of their not being the other one, one might claim that not being nothing is also a limitation on infinity and therefore I am incorrect in claiming that reality is infinite. This objection, however, conflates the concepts of nothing and limitation. Nothing is mere convention. Even in physics, zero is infinity because one can be divided by zero an infinite number of times. Furthermore, nothing is both not real and impossible and if it is not real and impossible, then, it cannot be a limit. A limit, itself, is a thing. Therefore, not being nothing cannot seriously be considered a limitation on reality and by no means necessitates concluding that the ultimate nature of reality is not infinite.
In addition to these objections, there is an empirical matter that might be purportedly threatening the constant continuity that has been derived from the infinite nature of reality and its constitutive parts and that is the issue of nonlocal causality. This criticism, I presume, claims that if there are nonlocal causes then there cannot be constant continuity and if there is not constant continuity, then causality cannot be justified in this deductive manner, but this objection, like the rest, seems misguided. By constant continuity, I mean that there are parts that will never cease to have a relationship with another part or parts or whole for that matter. The matter of distance between the parts is irrelevant to the issue of constant continuity. Certainly, I accept that there may be some entities in reality that exhibit nonlocal influence over other entities, much like the relationships that have been demonstrated in the famous EPR experiments. Now, it might be true that there are not nonlocal influences on the half-spin particles in the EPR experiment and that it is a matter of time before hidden-variables are discovered or furthermore, that neither local nor nonlocal influences need exist and that holistic correlation properties are the more appropriate interpretation of the experiment given special relativity, but the type of causality is irrelevant to the concept of constant continuity. All that matters is that any real entity exhibits some type of relationship with another entity or entities for constant continuity to not be violated.
The final objection I will consider is an argument from perception deficiency and misunderstanding. This criticism claims that our senses cannot be trusted. One might accept the argument from nothing and the conclusion that the nature of reality must infinite, but reject the notion that there are parts by virtue of our existence and experience. After all, if the argument from nothing succeeds and reality is one infinite thing, then, it might seem senseless to consider it as constituted by parts. This is a thoughtful criticism and I will give it its due consideration. First, there is no contradiction in reality being constituted by parts and understood as one thing. An infinite set of numbers is something that I have returned to frequently and is one example. We, ourselves, are another. Our bodies, no doubt, consist of parts. Human beings have stomachs, livers, lungs, brains, etc. but despite this constitution a single human being is still considered just that- a single human being. Secondly, and this is a topic of much debate elsewhere and I cannot go into great depth on this matter here, our perceptions though they may be wrong in part are never wrong in their entirety. Hallucinations and misperceptions never occur in every sense at the same time. The most insane of men are not teleported into a completely different reality. A person may hear voices which don’t exist, see objects that are not there, or feel things in limbs that have been severed, but never do all five of their senses fail at once. Finally, our senses have been carefully cultivated by reality to understand and function in and with reality. They would either serve a meaningless function or be entirely inefficient if they weren’t. Evolution and natural selection necessitate this.
I have taken great care to consider a multitude of potential objections and criticisms and I believe that I have sufficiently resolved them, but as I have mentioned many times in undertaking this task, the success of my argument, in its entirely, is pending. The truth of this matter cannot be resolved by myself, but by the careful analysis of others. Mistakes in my reasoning or lapses in my argument may still lie outside of the scope of my faculties. Still, I do not take this project lightly. Much is at stake. Even in failure, I hope to manage some ounce of success- at least in directing this problem towards its final resolution.
The discipline of philosophy is a noble and important one. Too often now it seems that it has been reduced to rubbish. Too few of its practitioners are persons of empiricism. The philosophers need be reminded that it is their work, long ago, that made science possible. It is their work that inspired awe at the sight of the stars and the loss of breath at the sound of waves. Somewhere this connection was lost. Somewhere philosophy went from explaining the nature of reality to explaining it away. It has become the lost dog of academia, spat on too frequently by scientists whose work is continuous with its tasks. Philosophy is not a haven for the justification of desires. Its subject is not finding reasons or support for persons’ superstitions. Its design is not intended to discover the premises of its wanted conclusions. Its tool is reason and its responsibility in caring for it is immense. Reason is not free and it is not cheap. Its value when properly done and its shine when correctly polished are more remarkable than any precious metal. Words like “theodicy” are a stain on it. Reality has imparted an understanding of it upon us and we should not be so foolish to let it go to waste.