Rather than the body/brain actively doing something in order to achieve something else, I see this as a passive result of the universe's tendency to fall towards the most common state in probabilistic terms. Like water flowing downhill, this "entropic pressure" can drive other processes-"complexification", for example.
Hmm... That's probably the wrong analogy. If complexity is the opposite of entropy, then perhaps this tendency for the pressure of entropy to generate its mirror image is more like the heat exchanger in a fridge than a waterwheel.
But then, maybe the water analogy isn't so far-fetched; maybe the physical universe is merely the temporary turbulence on the huge, still pool of probability caused by the energy released in the Big Bang, sloshing back and forth from entropy to complexity to entropy again, slowly and inexorably returning to the absolute still of maximum entropy as the ripples die away.
I think the whole memespace is intersubjective. A lot of our minds exist outside us and between us. In some senses, we're merely hosts to the Zeitgeist.
I have a sense you're overloading "language" a little, although I sympathise with the position. Those aspects of what most people consider "mind" which don't involve language are probably reducible to neurology. (And yes, I realise that's slightly circular reasoning.)
Some folks would say mind as you describe it can exist without a brain. I think it depends on what you classify as a brain. Are you talking about individual mind as separate from group mind? And if mind and brain are so symbiotically entwined, is it really important what label we use, except for the needs of classification?
Some folks would say mind as you describe it can exist without a brain.
I am suggesting that. A lot of the information which constitutes our minds has been externalised into some physical form (more so recently), or exists only in the agreements between us which constitute "meaning".
if mind and brain are so symbiotically entwined, is it really important what label we use, except for the needs of classification?
I'm suggesting, I guess, that the way we think about mind is fundamentally different to the way we think about brain or body, so it's confusing and misleading to consider them part of the same system.
I find it quite difficult to think about 'mind' without thinking about 'brain' - mostly because even with externalised mind, it requires the hardware to function.
It becomes easier when I think about drugs. Blah blah chemical is a such-and-such agonist in rhubarb synapse and causes x hormone to be released, inhibiting etcetera uptake and causing yadda yadda functional response. Yet 50 different brains doing the same chemical process might respond in 50 different ways through the filter of the mind.
I find it quite difficult to think about 'mind' without thinking about 'brain' - mostly because even with externalised mind, it requires the hardware to function.
This is true; but then, function (ie. process) is just pattern extended into the time dimension to which we agree to ascribe meaning.
Yet 50 different brains doing the same chemical process might respond in 50 different ways through the filter of the mind.
For me, the big mystery of the universe is how (or indeed whether) the mind can influence the physical world. Call me superstitious, but I find it hard to accept that consciousness really is epiphenomenal.
I'm a dualist. Why aren't you?Because being a dualist is treating the brain as a black box, and doing so consistently. In some cases, when you are talking about it at a very high, abstract level, this is a perfectly sensible attitude -- a car is a vehicle that moves you around, whether it is powered by internal combustion or electrical storage, what matters is not the mechanism but that it goes. In other cases, its a ridiculous attitude -- to perform even trivial operation of your car, you actually need to know whether you fill it with petrol or plug it into a power point. There are times when questions about the mind cannot easily be related to neuroscience, and the relationship of the two is not particularly useful -- just as sometimes the action of the engine is irrelevant to describing the route you drove. But there are other times when the relationship between neuroscience and the mind is important and valuable, such as discussing the effects of brain injury, or the effects of drug induced neurotransmitter balance changes
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Describing yourself as a dualist without qualification most commonly implies Cartesian dualism, and I'm pretty sure you aren't one of those
Oh, but I am. Except I think the soul is memetic, not ectoplasmic.
a true dualist would regard the mind and brain as separate, and so regard the idea that, for example, brain injury causes mind injury to be clearly wrong.
This is indeed the mind-body problem-and it seems a lot less problematic that changes to the brain affect the mind than vice-versa.
I'm suspecting (though I'm not sure) that you are trying to make some sort of ontological stance here.
I am indeed: Software vs Hardware, essentially.
Though you might also want to look at ideas like epi-phenomenalism, or John Searles viewpoint, to see if it fits your philosophical stance better.
Searle's ontological subjectivity ends up being dubious semantic hopscotch imho, and I recoil from epiphenomenalism-albeit for dubiously subjective reasons-which leaves me a reluctant interactionalist.
Except I think the soul is memetic, not ectoplasmic. Well, I've already expressed my fairly scathing opinions of that memetics malarky. A fancy word to dress up a single insight as being more broadly applicable than it actually is.
it seems a lot less problematic that changes to the brain affect the mind than vice-versa I should think the idea that changes to the mind affect the brain can be demonstrated fairly trivially with a PET or MRI machine, even an ECG. There are plenty of other ways, though.
I'm not sure I'm dedicated enough to engage more formally with the field The Churchland book I mentioned, for example, is a lot shorter than most of Dennetts books, and no more complex to read, just more of a textbook style survey of the field than a single argument pursued. Dennett is pretty good value, though.
I've already expressed my fairly scathing opinions of that memetics malarky
Saying "it's informatic" or "it's pattern-based" doesn't seem as poetic. You dont need to buy into the claims of memetics as a science to agree that complex arrangements of information can have emergent properties.
I should think the idea that changes to the mind affect the brain can be demonstrated fairly trivially with a PET or MRI machine, even an ECG.
Not problematic in the sense of accepting that changes to the mind affect the brain, rather problematic in the sense of understanding the means by which this occurs.
Either the mind is irrelevant, or it's the same as the brain, or there's some as yet unfathomed interaction between the two. Maybe it's my Catholic background, but I'm currently clinging to the mystery option.
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The body/brain takes fuel, increases the fuel's entropy so that it can increase its own extropy/order/complexity.
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But then, maybe the water analogy isn't so far-fetched; maybe the physical universe is merely the temporary turbulence on the huge, still pool of probability caused by the energy released in the Big Bang, sloshing back and forth from entropy to complexity to entropy again, slowly and inexorably returning to the absolute still of maximum entropy as the ripples die away.
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(i know this doesn't answer your question)
Some folks would say mind as you describe it can exist without a brain. I think it depends on what you classify as a brain. Are you talking about individual mind as separate from group mind? And if mind and brain are so symbiotically entwined, is it really important what label we use, except for the needs of classification?
Reply
I am suggesting that. A lot of the information which constitutes our minds has been externalised into some physical form (more so recently), or exists only in the agreements between us which constitute "meaning".
if mind and brain are so symbiotically entwined, is it really important what label we use, except for the needs of classification?
I'm suggesting, I guess, that the way we think about mind is fundamentally different to the way we think about brain or body, so it's confusing and misleading to consider them part of the same system.
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It becomes easier when I think about drugs. Blah blah chemical is a such-and-such agonist in rhubarb synapse and causes x hormone to be released, inhibiting etcetera uptake and causing yadda yadda functional response. Yet 50 different brains doing the same chemical process might respond in 50 different ways through the filter of the mind.
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This is true; but then, function (ie. process) is just pattern extended into the time dimension to which we agree to ascribe meaning.
Yet 50 different brains doing the same chemical process might respond in 50 different ways through the filter of the mind.
For me, the big mystery of the universe is how (or indeed whether) the mind can influence the physical world. Call me superstitious, but I find it hard to accept that consciousness really is epiphenomenal.
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And, at the moment, a tired transcendentalist who can't construct arguments.
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Oh, but I am. Except I think the soul is memetic, not ectoplasmic.
a true dualist would regard the mind and brain as separate, and so regard the idea that, for example, brain injury causes mind injury to be clearly wrong.
This is indeed the mind-body problem-and it seems a lot less problematic that changes to the brain affect the mind than vice-versa.
I'm suspecting (though I'm not sure) that you are trying to make some sort of ontological stance here.
I am indeed: Software vs Hardware, essentially.
Though you might also want to look at ideas like epi-phenomenalism, or John Searles viewpoint, to see if it fits your philosophical stance better.
Searle's ontological subjectivity ends up being dubious semantic hopscotch imho, and I recoil from epiphenomenalism-albeit for dubiously subjective reasons-which leaves me a reluctant interactionalist.
I think you would enjoy (and make future ( ... )
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Well, I've already expressed my fairly scathing opinions of that memetics malarky. A fancy word to dress up a single insight as being more broadly applicable than it actually is.
it seems a lot less problematic that changes to the brain affect the mind than vice-versa
I should think the idea that changes to the mind affect the brain can be demonstrated fairly trivially with a PET or MRI machine, even an ECG. There are plenty of other ways, though.
I'm not sure I'm dedicated enough to engage more formally with the field
The Churchland book I mentioned, for example, is a lot shorter than most of Dennetts books, and no more complex to read, just more of a textbook style survey of the field than a single argument pursued. Dennett is pretty good value, though.
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Saying "it's informatic" or "it's pattern-based" doesn't seem as poetic. You dont need to buy into the claims of memetics as a science to agree that complex arrangements of information can have emergent properties.
I should think the idea that changes to the mind affect the brain can be demonstrated fairly trivially with a PET or MRI machine, even an ECG.
Not problematic in the sense of accepting that changes to the mind affect the brain, rather problematic in the sense of understanding the means by which this occurs.
Either the mind is irrelevant, or it's the same as the brain, or there's some as yet unfathomed interaction between the two. Maybe it's my Catholic background, but I'm currently clinging to the mystery option.
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