the korean "crisis"
Everybody is now making alarmist noises about the current Korean crisis, due to shelling of South Korean civilians by the North.
Let me be a contrary voice. I don't believe there is a crisis. I think the imminent risk of major war had passed as soon as the shooting stopped -- before newspapers went to press, before the US public woke up Tuesday morning.
I am disturbed and unhappy how ham-handed the US and SK reactions were. But I don't think there's any danger of escalation or a major war breaking out this month.
This sort of provocation by the North makes absolutely no sense as a deliberate precursor for war. Their main military advantage in an attack would be surprise; this removes much of that advantage.
What we're looking at is an extortion racket. Unfortunately, it's a protection racket with nuclear weapons. What I'm worried about is that it'll work. (As it has for NK in the past.) "That shiny capital city you have? Pay us off or it might be turned into a lake of radioactive fire." And even before we reach that point, "continue regular Danegeld payments or we'll scare off your investors."
The worry in the medium term is that SK will stop paying and will start shooting back, and that NK will ratchet up a bit as a further bluff, and it's possible for that to get out of control. Once shooting starts, 24-year-old captains at the front can do things they weren't told to do that can't be easily un-done. But we're not there yet and I don't think we will be in the immediate future. Hence, no crisis.
However, there has been an important and potentially ominous shift in the last few days as a result of this incident. South Korean public opinion as near as I can gather, has really shifted. Previously, the South appeared gunshy -- hesitant to risk provoking the North. That seems to be no longer true. The main thing I gather from the BBC's press summary that the South Korean press is now just as hyperbolic and bellicose as the North -- which they didn't used to be. The South Korean government is now under pressure from Parliament to react more strongly next time.
And so I think if there's another provocation along similar lines -- and there's always another provocation -- the South will be on a hair-trigger for military responses in a way they haven't been in the past. And I'm not sure the Northern leadership has properly appreciated that. It reminds me, somehow, of the passage in Bruce Catton's Civil War history where he explains that what made Fort Sumter explosive in April 1861 was that the authority to fire the first shot of the civil war had been pushed down from politicians to people who were mid-rank army officers.
We're there now with Korea. There isn't a crisis right now, but there's going to be a lot less damping out the next crisis when it breaks out.
Let me be a contrary voice. I don't believe there is a crisis. I think the imminent risk of major war had passed as soon as the shooting stopped -- before newspapers went to press, before the US public woke up Tuesday morning.
I am disturbed and unhappy how ham-handed the US and SK reactions were. But I don't think there's any danger of escalation or a major war breaking out this month.
This sort of provocation by the North makes absolutely no sense as a deliberate precursor for war. Their main military advantage in an attack would be surprise; this removes much of that advantage.
What we're looking at is an extortion racket. Unfortunately, it's a protection racket with nuclear weapons. What I'm worried about is that it'll work. (As it has for NK in the past.) "That shiny capital city you have? Pay us off or it might be turned into a lake of radioactive fire." And even before we reach that point, "continue regular Danegeld payments or we'll scare off your investors."
The worry in the medium term is that SK will stop paying and will start shooting back, and that NK will ratchet up a bit as a further bluff, and it's possible for that to get out of control. Once shooting starts, 24-year-old captains at the front can do things they weren't told to do that can't be easily un-done. But we're not there yet and I don't think we will be in the immediate future. Hence, no crisis.
However, there has been an important and potentially ominous shift in the last few days as a result of this incident. South Korean public opinion as near as I can gather, has really shifted. Previously, the South appeared gunshy -- hesitant to risk provoking the North. That seems to be no longer true. The main thing I gather from the BBC's press summary that the South Korean press is now just as hyperbolic and bellicose as the North -- which they didn't used to be. The South Korean government is now under pressure from Parliament to react more strongly next time.
And so I think if there's another provocation along similar lines -- and there's always another provocation -- the South will be on a hair-trigger for military responses in a way they haven't been in the past. And I'm not sure the Northern leadership has properly appreciated that. It reminds me, somehow, of the passage in Bruce Catton's Civil War history where he explains that what made Fort Sumter explosive in April 1861 was that the authority to fire the first shot of the civil war had been pushed down from politicians to people who were mid-rank army officers.
We're there now with Korea. There isn't a crisis right now, but there's going to be a lot less damping out the next crisis when it breaks out.