(no subject)
Canada and Afghanistan
Presented to: Dr. David Gilles
Class# 3606B
By: Patrick Cloutier
Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan has many facets which all appeal to different themes within Canadian foreign policy. Afghanistan allows Canada to pursue a multilateral stance, through NATO and ISAF, while at the same time improving its position with the United States by participating. The various economic development and state building efforts in Afghanistan follow logically with international development assistance. The Afghanistan mission has been extremely controversial within Canada as well and this has had a heavy influence on how the now three different Canadian governments have reacted to the challenges there. Particularly in relation to the popular conception of Afghanistan as another American war similar to the deeply unpopular Iraq war. Canadian policy in Afghanistan is representative of Canadian foreign policy abroad. This essay will examine Canada’s various activities in Afghanistan and explore how they relate with broader Canadian principles, of international affairs.
Canada became involved in Afghanistan following the terrorist attack on the world trade center. NATO deemed the attack worthy of article five of the treaty, meaning NATO nations are to act as though the attack was against their own nation (Cox 07). Canada unequivocally accepted this interpretation and was quick to pledge support for the US response. When the Americans made the decision to invade Afghanistan in January 02, Canada was there with a commitment of 1200 soldiers (Cox 07). Canada’s initial commitment lasted only till July 02 after which point the soldiers were sent home, however Canadian soldiers were sent back Afghanistan in August 03, under ISAF and have remained in Afghanistan since (Cox 07). Invading Canada-US forces faced overwhelming success in their battles with Taliban forces, resulting in massive Taliban casualties, estimates of early Taliban loses in Kandahar put their casualties at around ten thousand (Yung, 07). Amazingly the Taliban were able to recover from their heavy loses, by retreating into the Pashtun regions of Pakistan and rethinking their strategy. In 06 the Taliban returned and focused much more heavily on insurgent tactics making extensive use of roadside bombs (Yung 07) . The ISAF nations realizing that they were perhaps concentrating to heavily on the military side of operations in Afghanistan singed the “Afghan Compact” which is an agreement to help Afghanistan develop three key areas “a. Security B. Governance, the rule of law and human rights C. economic and social development.” (Casson et al. 07) .
Canada’s decision to participate in the Afghanistan mission is the continuation of a policy of co-operation with international interventions. With the exception of Vietnam and Iraq Canada has participated in almost every international intervention since the Second World War. When North Korea invaded South Korea Canada was there, Canada participated in the first gulf war and in Bosnia. To Canada it is important to maintain a distinct and separate identity from the America, and as a result Canada has gone out of its way to participate in a wide range of international agreements. It is also important for Canada to keep good relations with the United States; as a result any initiative which can do both Canada will jump on. Afghanistan is one of these, a mission which is internationally supported and very important to the Americans.
Afghanistan is one of the poorest nations in the world, and has a GDP per capita of a little under 2000$ US (Holden 07) . Once Canada became involved in Afghanistan it didn’t take long for CIDA to begin handing out aid. Since 2001 Canada’s pledges of aid have grown to its current total of 1.2 billion$ , making Afghanistan Canada’s largest recipient of aid (Sorenson et all 07). Afghanistan’s economy faces many problems. Foremost are the incredibly disruptive effects of the insurgency and continued war. Lesser but significant problems are the lack of infrastructure, or governmental institutions. (holden 07). Due to the lack of government institutions, it is difficult to get hard figures on the afghan economy, which causes challenges when attempting to encourage development. Afghanistan’s economy is heavily tied to agriculture, with an estimated 80% of the afghan economy coming from agriculture (Holden 07). Afghanistan supplies 90% of the world’s opium supply, and consequently opium production is believed to account for about a third of Afghanistan’s economy (Holden 07). Opium is illegal in most of the world, this has led various members of ISAF to attempt to curb or limit opium production. The main producers are poor farmers, who plant the opium because it is easy to tend for and provides better returns then the alternatives (Holden 07). Unsurprisingly attempts to curb production have been very unpopular and the Taliban have been quick to use this to their advantage by protecting opium farmers, and giving them assistance. (yung 07)
Despite the challenges the international community has had success in improving the situation of the afghani economy. Since 03 the afghan economy has shown consistent strong growth, however with the current situation of the global economy it will remain to be seen if this continues (Holden 07). The IMF has been steadily increasing Afghanistan’s fiscal ratings, as the government continues to meet their guidelines. Afghanistan has also secured debt forgiveness from some of its largest debtors, such as Russia who recently forgave 10 billion in soviet debt (Holden 07 ). Canada hopes to achieve two things with its aid, to increase the afghan government’s legitimacy by funneling funding through them and develop the economy. Canada aid efforts are aimed at the improvement of afghan agriculture, due to its prominent role in the afghan economy. They will attempt to do this by helping the afghan government establish improved irrigation systems, as well as introduce hardier strains of grains which will better survive Afghanistan’s dry climates (Holden 07). By passing the funding through the afghan government the hope is it will build afghan capabilities by having them do the work, rather then simply doing it for them.
There are concerns that the aid that Canada and other nations are providing is either insufficient or inefective. A significant concern is that a significant portion of aid delivered by Canada is in the form of “rapid impact” projects. Such projects focus on providing immediate and obvious improvements, things such as footbridges or similar efforts. The problem with “rapid impact” projects is due to their rapid nature, often times locals aren’t properly consulted and the projects end up being of limited use (Sorrensen et.all 07 pg.6). It is a widely held opinion that insufficient amounts of aid are reaching Afghanis. This is despite the 1.2 billion dollars pledged by Canada. Reducing the effectiveness of the provided aid, most of the aid money is spent outside Afghanistan. If the money were spent in Afghanistan it would have the benefit of creating jobs and delivering aid to Afghans (Sorrensen et all. 07 pg. 4). The practice of passing aid through afghani government is also criticized. The critics point out that only a handful of afghani government ministries are effective. Not only does the ineffective afghan government reduce results, it also focuses aid away from the private sector, which is needed to nurture a sustainable economy ( Sorrensen et all. Pg. 5). Despite their criticism the critics do believe that CIDA should be the organization to continue spearheading Canadian development in Afghanistan. The overall perception was that CIDA was and is making some real progress in Afghanistan, but that they should focus their activities in different areas and increase them (Sorrensen et all 07 pg.7) .
While Canada’s actions and criticism of those actions have been discussed, little has so far been said about what the government intends to do. The government’s most recent intentions in Afghanistan were outlined in a government report “Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan”. Partially in response to the criticism against the Canadian mission, the government revaluated its priorities in Afghanistan. The government report on Canada’s new priorities in Afghanistan, are a continuation of previous policies, if more focused. The report sets out six goals.
“1. Enable the Afghan National Security Forces in Kandahar to sustain a more secure environment and promote law and order. 2. Strengthen Afghan institutional capacity to deliver core services and promote economic growth, enhancing the confidence of Kandaharis in their government. 3. Provide humanitarian assistance for extremely vulnerable people, including refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons. 4. Enhance border security, with facilitation of bilateral dialogue between Afghan and Pakistani authorities.
These Kandahar-centred priorities will be reinforced by two priorities to be pursued at thenational level:
5. Help advance Afghanistan’s capacity for democratic governance by contributing to effective, accountable public institutions and electoral processes. 6. Facilitate Afghan-led efforts toward political reconciliation.” ( Government of Canada 08 pg.1)
These goals are logical continuation of efforts undertaken earlier. There is the continued efforts in improving security, however there is a new focus on development. Mentioned later in the report is the announcement of several large scale “signature” projects. Such as the refurbishment of a large dam used for irrigation, a commitment to help open several hundred schools and eradicate polio by the end of 2009. Also the government has clearly concentrated most of Canadian aid with 50% of it now being destined for Kandahar province, where most Canadian soldiers are located (government of Canada 08 pg. 2). The revelation of the mission and the larger concentration on civil development, is in response to decreasing support for the mission. Which has been seen to concentrate to heavily on military aspects, compounded by increasing military casualties support for the mission has fallen steadily and is currently at an all time low (CBC news 08).
It has been said that all politics are local; Canadians typically support peacekeeping, humanitarian aid and international co-operation, while distrusting excessively close cooperation with the United States. Perhaps fatally for public support of the mission ere the statements that Afghanistan is not a peacekeeping mission and its close links to American response to 9/11 despite its international characteristic. These realities have made the government make a real effort to rebred the mission in a light more palatable to Canadians. Simply looking at the cover of the government report, “Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan”, one can get an idea of what the government wishes to display as its policy direction. Pictured from left to right is; Hamid Karzai, the president of Afghanistan, sanding in front of a Canadian flag, an ISAF officer shaking hands with afghan recruits, a woman standing in front of a blackboard, a photo of a afghan flag flying over an outpost, a child receiving an injection, a group men consulting on a afghan rug while drinking tea, bellow is a large photo of smiling afghan children, topping of the collection is a maple leaf ( Canadian Government 08). The various photos emphasize different things which Canadians would support. Karzai and the Canadian flag are to remind Canadians of the nascent afghan democracy, as well as Canada’s role in ensuring its continued development. The woman in front of the blackboard is pointed, considering Taliban practice of aggressively attacking female education; this photo serves a double purpose highlighting Taliban savagery and Canadian support of human rights. The afghan outpost is important in promoting the image of independent Afghanistan capable of defending itself; this is to better support government plans to cease military activity in 2011. The child receiving the injection is an appeal to strong Canadian support for international aid, while also being reminiscent of health care. The men consulting on the rug with tea pushes the idea of reconciliation, and grass roots participation. The children are the embodiment of Afghanistan’s hope for a bright future. The maple leaf toping the ensemble is another reminder these are the things Canada is doing and supports. These photos are of course representations of Canada’s six key objectives in Afghanistan (Canadian Government 08 pg.7). Canada’s objectives were reworked with public opinion in mind, as evident when throughout the article there is no reference to the United States. In addition any mention of the Canadian forces is mentioned in conjunction with a pledge to help build the afghan security forces.
Mentioned are Canada’s objectives in Afghanistan, and criticisms of some of Canada’s efforts, however these are observations of specific issues within the mission. There have been many critics of the mission based on the very reason we are there, there has also been question raised over the true desires of Afghans. The Government has commissioned a committee looking at how Canada is doing in Afghanistan; this committed dedicated a section to discussing the differing opinions on the matter, the committee was made up of MP’s from various political parties. One of the objections examined by the committee is that “some Canadians” feel Canadian forces are in Afghanistan only to appease the Americans for not participating in Iraq (Collins et all 08 pg.1). The official government line is that Canada is in Afghanistan as a result of its commitment to NATO and not some kowtowing to US interests. The divisiveness of the issue is highlighted when the committee mentions its own internal divisions on the matter. The view of Afghanistan as an American effort, with begrudging support from NATO is consistently supported by NATO’s varying levels of commitment to the mission. The majority of the forces in Afghanistan are American, what NATO forces are there, are in handfuls and often operate under restrictive caveats. A striking example of begrudging NATO support was the difficulty Canada had in finding a mere thousand soldiers to support our efforts in Khandahar province, despite the extra troops, troop levels in Khandahar are still low (Collins et all 08 pg2). The Committee acknowledges the issue is highly debatable, but points out we cant know what the reasons for going truly were until recordings of the cabinet meetings are released decades in the future. The commitee goes on to say the reasons we went to Afghanistan are irrelevant, what is relevant is that the afghan people are extremely disadvantaged and that Canada is in a position to help ( Collins et al 08 pg 4). Such a message is similar to the one which has been used by the various Canadian governments from the beginning of the afghan mission, if more honest then politicians usually are. This is a message that has resonated with Canadian values; it is reminiscent of the welfare state which Canadians generally support. Despite the supportable language of the mission mounting death tolls have consistently worn down Canadian public support.
Afghan reaction to NATO force’s presence is thought to be generally positive. A parliamentary committee Afghanistan who personally visited and spoke to the locals without the presence of officials wee met with a generally positive response. Their opinion was that the locals had been general hones with them, they did acknowledge that opposition to the mission certainly exists ( Kenny et all 08 pg.5). However there exist real reasons for Afghan opposition to the mission. Some of the reasons are out of frightened self interests, others due to the damage NATO forces cause fighting the Taliban and finally there are genuine Taliban supporters in Afghanistan. Afghans who work for the government or in construction efforts or even simply take advantage of aid are regularly threatened by the Taliban with death threats. Some afghans due to fear of reprisal should the Taliban eventually win may be publicly opposing the government. Collateral damage caused by military actions do occur and have led to condemnations from various areas, from the afghan president to western peace activists. It is rather obvious that such occurrences do nothing to increase afghan support.
Another area worth observation is the cost of the mission. Much debate has gone into the mission, the government as been very open with announcements of foreign aid pledges. However they have been fairly tight lipped about what has actually been delivered. The first information released on the total costs of the mission in Afghanistan, was a report released just recently in October 2008. The report took a variety of factors into consideration including possible deployment sizes, operational tempo and aid investments. The report were based on estimates due to no official results being released, however they estimated the total cost of the afghan war to be between 13.9 to 18.1 billion (Mathilakah et al. 08 pg. 8). The report raised several issues around the war primarily the secrecy around the military budget in Afghanistan. They also pointed out that the indirect means in which the afghan mission is funded makes it difficult to estimate the costs. It wasn’t only the military who surrounded its budget with secrecy but also CIDA, who does not provide project by project budgets. The long time costs of providing care for veterans could also vary widely; however current loses are proving costly (Mathilakah et al. 08 pg. 8). The reports concerns about the opaqueness of the war funding are justified. The Canadian public whose support for the mission is wavering should know the costs of the mission.
The afghan mission is one that has been deeply divisive among Canadians among all political stripes. It has also brought out long running themes within Canadian policy, and has been exemplary of how the Canadian government wishes to be seen in the world. Among the long running themes among Canadian policy is the practice of emphasizing multilateral efforts and playing down involvement with the Americans. Official government reports will go out of their way to emphasize that the mission is a NATO led one, and will noticeably fail to mention American involvement. This is a policy aimed creating a image of an independent Canada pursuing an independent role with nations across the world. Also prominent are the promotion Canadian values, which have been practiced widely in the application of Canadian aid. Canada’s high respect for social welfare sees it, however successfully or unsuccessfully, attempting to build schools, improve medical access and gender equality. Long standing Canadian values have also been challenged by Afghanistan. Principal among them peace keeping for the first time since Korea Canadian troops have been engaged in combat. Contrary to many Canadians belief during the beginning of the mission that Canadians were engaged in peacekeeping. The afghan mission is a microcosm of Canadian foreign policy, and the Canadian debate on the mission has made clear the divisions among Canadians on the role Canadians should be taking.
Casson R, Bachand C, Cannis J, Black D, Blaney S, Bouchard R, Coderre D, Gallant C, Hawn L, Hiebert R, Martin K, Mcguire J (2007) “Canadian Forces in Afghanistan ” Standing Committee on National Deffence. 39th parliament 1st session.
Cox, J. (2007) “ Afghanistan : the Canadian military mission” InfoSeries; Library of Parliament. PRB 07-19E.
Holden M. (2007) “ Afghanistan : Economic Activity and Policy Changes ” InfoSeries; Library of Parliament. PRB 07-29E.
Yung, J. (2007) “ Afghanistan : the Taliban” InfoSeries; Library of Parliament. PRB 07-27E.
CBC News (2008)http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/09/05/poll-afghan.html