William James, Lecture II: What Pragmatism Means

[epictetus_rex]

Week two! Here, James introduces the pragmatic method, and it is on this that I want to focus. It seems to me that there is a difference between the two general formulations of the “pragmatic method”, and an important one. One formulation goes

Comments

[virtual_anima]

I generally agree, the only thing I'd say is that just because truth becomes less useful(as described in the paragraph that starts How might X convince another person...), does not mean that is not reality.

I get tired of people saying that because something is hard to work with, or doesn't turn out very nice, we should assume it's not the way it is.

[paulhope]

Just wanted to note I read this a while ago and intended on responding all week, but have been locked in debate in real_ for a while that's taken all my (suddenly precious) free philosophizing time. That said, I really appreciate this post and wish I had more to say.

I agree that the pragmatic theory of truth is problematic. I also like it these days anyway, for some reason. I'll try to have more to say once you get to that lecture.

I think most interesting thing for me about this lecture was that while the pragmatic method, as described, seems like a great idea, as illustrated by the squirrel example, I'm not really sure why it would be true. It seems to get its power purely by thinking about examples where an argument is demonstrated to be stupid because, dammit, it depends on what you mean by "going around" the tree. And if you ask which is the "correct" way to use "go around", you're asking what a linguistic convention is. "Correct" here is used in the sense of correct etiquette, not in the sense of a correct proof or

[sodapopinski51]

Im reading James' Varieties of Religious Experience for a James seminar this semester, and I was wondering if you've read that book. How might the themes you are dealing with here, shed some light on the notion of "Conversion" that he develops about mid-way through Varieties.
It seems to me that Conversion is only possible in a pragmatic sense, but this half-baked thought of mine can definitely be developed further.

[nanikore]

I should have replied to your comment instead of directly to the OP since it might have something to do with what you were looking for. I'll cut and paste for your convenience:

A person's beliefs can be justified on the grounds of subjective experience. However, this justification will only work for the person with that experience.

I think people are going about interpreting the mode of justification that James placed forward incorrectly. James had already admitted that a "live hypothesis" could only be "live" for the person with the experiences that enable such hypothesis to be "live". See the parallel James made with the electrical connections connecting or not connecting.

In other words, if I experiences something and form beliefs as a result of that experience, I would be justified in those beliefs. If you can't relate to that experience (mostly because you haven't had something like it yourself) of course you wouldn't be justified in believing the sort of things that I did- those aren't your experiences.

[nanikore]

A person's beliefs can be justified on the grounds of subjective experience. However, this justification will only work for the person with that experience.

I think people are going about interpreting the mode of justification that James placed forward incorrectly. James had already admitted that a "live hypothesis" could only be "live" for the person with the experiences that enable such hypothesis to be "live". See the parallel James made with the electrical connections connecting or not connecting.

In other words, if I experiences something and form beliefs as a result of that experience, I would be justified in those beliefs. If you can't relate to that experience (mostly because you haven't had something like it yourself) of course you wouldn't be justified in believing the sort of things that I did- those aren't your experiences.

[essius]

The pragmatic method was actually first formulated by Peirce, who doesn't countenance the second and more zany part of pragmatism. But due to the popularization of James's presentation, Peirce renamed his doctrine "pragmaticism"-a term ugly enough to be "safe from kidnappers."

You're right that the second principle, of truth as the useful, is less useful. In a graduate paper I once argued via MacIntyre against Rorty that the medieval understanding of truth as adequatio intellectus et rei is a much more useful notion-indeed, even potentially life-saving in some cases.

It's also worth noting that for Peirce, as opposed to James, truth is that towards which a "community of inquirers" will tend to ultimately accept. Similar to an "ideal observer" theory.