That doesn't seem to me to quite be the surprise exam scenario. To make it more similar, you would have to know at the beginning that you'd have more than one interview, and know at the beginning that on any given day, you won't know whether or not you'll be called about an interview. However, it sounds like you didn't know two weeks ago that you wouldn't know tomorrow morning whether you'd be called about an interview.
This is a different sort of scenario that also seems epistemically interesting, where you've gone from having knowledge to not having knowledge without any forgetting. I would take the moral of the story to be that knowledge requires a high degree of belief (but doesn't require probability 1) and that the particular facts you've conditionalized on have lowered your degree of belief from a level where it could count as knowledge (given appropriate justification, truth, and non-Gettier conditions) to a level where it can't.
it seems like your degree of belief that you will have more than one job interview has been lowered to the point where you are questioning whether the belief is true. However, I can't see why: if the last friday before the APA is the same friday that by the end of which you expect to have multiple interviews, and it is this friday where all the calls requesting to meet you at the APA go out, then why are in a situation to bring your belief that you will have more than one interview into question? Did you expect, against how it generally works, that you would get calls requesting an interview before the last friday before the APA? If so, why? If not, then why is your belief being called into question now.
It seems that either you should never have formed the belief in the first place, or that you are questioning it arationally. I can kind of see how this is similar to a surprise exam, but it looks like premise (4) is what rules out this as really being a case of a surprise exam scenario, right?
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This is a different sort of scenario that also seems epistemically interesting, where you've gone from having knowledge to not having knowledge without any forgetting. I would take the moral of the story to be that knowledge requires a high degree of belief (but doesn't require probability 1) and that the particular facts you've conditionalized on have lowered your degree of belief from a level where it could count as knowledge (given appropriate justification, truth, and non-Gettier conditions) to a level where it can't.
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It seems that either you should never have formed the belief in the first place, or that you are questioning it arationally. I can kind of see how this is similar to a surprise exam, but it looks like premise (4) is what rules out this as really being a case of a surprise exam scenario, right?
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