I see how beliefs can be reasons for actions. (For instance, the reason why Bob robbed the bank was because Bob believed there was money in the vault (even if there wasn't)). But I don't see how beliefs can be reasons for things other than human actions.
I see reasons as things that give us some satisfactory explanation for why something is true. Reasons are things that make us feel like we understand why something is true, in contrast to just believing it's true. I don't feel like beliefs themselves, whether it's other poeple's beliefs or my own, give me that sense of understanding why something is true.
I can understand that usage. But I think there is a good case to be made in favor of the view that beliefs can be reasons.
One thing to note is that we do talk about our reasons to believe things we believe. If you ask me why I think the Lakers will do well next season, I'll give you list of things I believe: 1) They will be hungry from their recent loss. 2) They will likely have Bynum and Mihm back in the lineup. 3) They will have the reigning MVP on the team.
If we think of what reasoning is, it seems to involve the use of reasons. But reasoning is a process that beliefs participate in. If I deduce that the butler done it, I do so on the basis of beliefs I have. When I conclude that the butler done it, I have reasons to think that I am correct.
Hmmm... maybe it boils down to a difference in the way we speak about beliefs. I like to think of beliefs as simply attitudes that people have towards particular propositions. So it's hard for me to think of an attitude as being a reason. I would say it's the proposition itself that counts as a reason for something.
I'd agree that "they will have the reigning MVP on the team" is a reason why the Lakers might do well next season. But I guess I don't see your belief in that as a reason why they might do well. I just see your belief in it as a reason why you would believe they'd do well.
I don't know if everyone makes such a clear distinction between belief and truth as I like to... maybe if you try to keep them perfectly separate you run into epistemological problems elsewhere. But that's at least how I tend to think of it.
I agree that there is a relationship of propositional justification--one proposition's being true makes it more likely that a second proposition is true. And there will always be true propositions which provide propositional justification for any given truth. But if agents are to make use of such propositions when trying to reason from one thing to another, they may do so only with those propositions that they believe. One cannot correctly reason from what one does not even believe to be the case to some particular conclusion which one then adopts. Sure, the content of the belief is contributing to its being a reason, but the content alone can't be deployed as a reason unless one adopts the attitude of belief towards it.
It seems to me that you are conflating 'reasons' with 'justification.' It is possible to say a belief is justification for some behavior or proposition, which is similar to saying it is a 'reason' for such things. However, it seems to me that 'reason' has a more causal connotation than 'justification.'
For example, I may believe that the Lakers will win next season and I can use this to justify my behavior of betting in their favor. However, it seems like a stronger claim to say that my belief that the Lakers will win is the reason I bet in their favor.
Moreover, it seems the internalist conception of justification is hard-pressed to give an account of implicit beliefs that justify certain actions. That is to say, not everyone is self-reflectively aware of all their beliefs, thus their beliefs alone are not enough to justify all behaviors or propositions espoused by such people.
I'm not sure an internalist about justification has to say anything about how beliefs justify actions. There might be all sorts of factors relevant to the justification of an action that don't have anything to do with the justification of a belief, even if the action involves believing some proposition p. (For example, there might be some facts which are ethically wrong to know.) It seems to me that the two needn't go together.
Do you think that an internalist about justification must have an account about how implicit beliefs justify some actions?
Do you think that an internalist about justification must have an account about how implicit beliefs justify some actions
Well, the core principle of internalist justification is that "for any justified belief and accompanying justifier, one can become aware of the justifier, and do this merely by reflection.*" However, I'm just not certain that this is, in fact, true. As I said, I believe that actual humans in the actual world have implicit beliefs, some of which are not accessible to reflection - either because of a lack of reflection by the person or because they are such fundamental beliefs that they underlie higher level beliefs that the person actually has reflective access to. So, I suppose what I'm saying is that internalism must have an account for this, and since it doesn't (and, in fact, cannot), it is false.
You should look up "Having Reasons", by my future colleague Mark Schroeder. I think he argues that the notion of reason is ambiguous between an internal and an external notion, and that we shouldn't confuse internal reasons with external reasons that we "have" in some sense. Though you'll probably get more out of it if you read the paper more carefully than I did.
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I see reasons as things that give us some satisfactory explanation for why something is true. Reasons are things that make us feel like we understand why something is true, in contrast to just believing it's true. I don't feel like beliefs themselves, whether it's other poeple's beliefs or my own, give me that sense of understanding why something is true.
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One thing to note is that we do talk about our reasons to believe things we believe. If you ask me why I think the Lakers will do well next season, I'll give you list of things I believe: 1) They will be hungry from their recent loss. 2) They will likely have Bynum and Mihm back in the lineup. 3) They will have the reigning MVP on the team.
If we think of what reasoning is, it seems to involve the use of reasons. But reasoning is a process that beliefs participate in. If I deduce that the butler done it, I do so on the basis of beliefs I have. When I conclude that the butler done it, I have reasons to think that I am correct.
Is that convincing?
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I'd agree that "they will have the reigning MVP on the team" is a reason why the Lakers might do well next season. But I guess I don't see your belief in that as a reason why they might do well. I just see your belief in it as a reason why you would believe they'd do well.
I don't know if everyone makes such a clear distinction between belief and truth as I like to... maybe if you try to keep them perfectly separate you run into epistemological problems elsewhere. But that's at least how I tend to think of it.
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How's that?
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For example, I may believe that the Lakers will win next season and I can use this to justify my behavior of betting in their favor. However, it seems like a stronger claim to say that my belief that the Lakers will win is the reason I bet in their favor.
Moreover, it seems the internalist conception of justification is hard-pressed to give an account of implicit beliefs that justify certain actions. That is to say, not everyone is self-reflectively aware of all their beliefs, thus their beliefs alone are not enough to justify all behaviors or propositions espoused by such people.
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Do you think that an internalist about justification must have an account about how implicit beliefs justify some actions?
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Well, the core principle of internalist justification is that "for any justified belief and accompanying justifier, one can become aware of the justifier, and do this merely by reflection.*" However, I'm just not certain that this is, in fact, true. As I said, I believe that actual humans in the actual world have implicit beliefs, some of which are not accessible to reflection - either because of a lack of reflection by the person or because they are such fundamental beliefs that they underlie higher level beliefs that the person actually has reflective access to. So, I suppose what I'm saying is that internalism must have an account for this, and since it doesn't (and, in fact, cannot), it is false.
*http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-intext/#3
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