Medieval Philosophy: the Negative Atribution of God
The Guide of the Perplexed, the seminal work of Moses Maimonides, became a foundational work for the scholastics, and anyone else who would engage in the philosophy of God. Chapters 51 and 52 are the most important in the work, as they lay out Maimonides’ theory of negative attribution. According to this view, no positive attribution may be made about God; he examines all the kinds of positive attributes, and argues that none of these can logically be predicated of God. The arguments he makes remain quite relevant today, and are very strong arguments by modern analytic standards.
These chapters depend on several major premises argued for earlier in the Guide, which must be enumerated to understand the claims made here. The first is that God exists necessarily, and that He is the Creator of the universe. Secondly, God is outside of time and space. Thirdly, God is both infinite and simple. In this case, the term “simple” means that God is not a differentiated entity in any way; he cannot be divided into parts like objects or many concepts can. These claims will be taken as granted for the sake of argument, but are very important for the arguments to follow. It is also important to understand that the terms used to predicate God here are to be understood as negative attribution. Simplicity, for example, should be taken as the lack of multiplicity. Likewise infinitude is the lack of finitude, necessity the lack of contingency, and so on for any term predicated of God.
Maimonides begins by examining what kinds of attributions we can make. In order to know what we can attribute to God, we must first know what we can attribute in general. Attributes, he claims, may either be the mode in which an essence exists, or some facet of the essence itself. He boldly states that it is obvious the former kind of attribute cannot apply to God, as it stipulates accidental attributes in God. “For that denial is a primary intelligible, inasmuch as an attribute is … a certain mode of the essence and hence an accident” (374) The latter kind of attribution is further broken down into two categories: tautologies and explanations. An example of a tautology, provided my Maimonides, is the statement “Man is man”. These are trivial, and not much worth considering. An explanation is a definition of something’s essence; Maimonides uses the example of “Man is a rational animal being”. Maimonides then dismisses the notion that there could be other kinds of attributes, which would be neither essential nor accidental to a thing, as mere speculation. “Some people engaged in speculation have ended by saying that His attributes ... are neither His essence nor a thing external to his essence…. These are things that are merely said; and accordingly, they subsist only in words, not in the mind”. (374-5) This is the groundwork for the major claims he makes in the next chapter.
The first kind of positive attribute to be examined is the definition. A definition is simply the explanation of a given essence, and must consist of an enumeration of the parts of the essence to be defined. In order to avoid a tautology, the definition must explain the essence in non-circular terms, so it must be a description of the more basic aspects of an essence. To use Maimonides’ chosen example again, “Man is a rational living being”, is to explain the essence of man by enumerating the more basic aspects of that essence. It should be clear then, why no definition can be predicated of God. He is perfectly simple; meaning there is no more basic aspect than God Himself. “For He . . . has no causes anterior to Him that are the cause of His existence, and by which, in consequence, He is defined” (375) With this understanding of definition, it is impossible to predicate one of God given His simplicity.
The second kind of positive attribute considered is the part of a definition. This would be one or more, but not all, of the aspects present in a given definition. “Man is a rational being” or “Man is a living being” are examples of this kind of attribute. From the previous paragraph, it should be easy to see why this idea is contradictory. For to have a part of a definition, one must suppose the essence in question has parts. But God’s simplicity requires that he has no multiplicity of parts, and is undifferentiated. “The absurdity of divine attributes belonging to this group is like the absurdity recognized with regard to the first group” (376) Partial definition of God is impossible, for the obvious reason that God lacks any parts.
The third kind of positive attribute is a quality, which is not part of the essence of a thing, but an accident external to the essence. “Accident”, in this context, simply refers to something that is contingent, rather than necessary. If God were to have qualities predicated of Him, it would mean God is a “substratum of accidents” (376) Maimonides claims that this by itself is enough to deny the claim that God may be qualified. “This is sufficient to show how far from His true reality and essence this is, I mean the supposition that He is endowed with quality.” Maimonides does go on, however, to list the four different kinds of qualities. First, there are qualities concerned with habit or disposition, qualities like “greedy”, “humble”, as well as any profession or skill. Secondly, there are natural qualities, such as “strong”, or “soft”. Thirdly, there are affections or passive qualities. These are both qualities like “humble” and “greedy” when they do not concern habit or a disposition, and also include things such as color, taste, and temperature. The last quality type is that of quantity. Length, shape, and other geometric qualities belong here. “Now when you consider all these attributes and what is akin to them, you will find it impossible to ascribe them to God”. (376) Indeed, God has no physical shape, so he cannot have qualities of the fourth kind. If He had physical shape, He could be divided into parts. For much the same reason, He cannot have natural qualities, as that would require He be a natural thing, which are finite. Affections of the physical sort can likewise not apply to God, and the remaining affections cannot pertain because He has no impressions. Finally, God has no habits, as they would require either a physical form, or a soul; both of these things are composite entities. By listing all the qualities a thing could have, and illustrating how each one is contrary to God’s nature as infinite and simple, Maimonides provides powerful reason to deny any qualities to God.
The fourth positive attribute Maimonides will analyze is relation. A relation is predicated of a thing that has some connection to another thing. For example, Mt. Everest is taller than Mt. Rainier, or Pope Benedict XVI is the successor to Jean-Paul II. Relations are not essences, nor are they things within an essence like qualities are, so Maimonides states it may seem acceptable to posit that God may have relations. “However, when one knows true reality and achieves greater exactness in speculation, the fact that this is impossible becomes clear”. (377) The reason for this refutation of relations predicated of God lies in His profound difference from all other things. God exists outside of space and time, which already means many of the relations are not compatible with him. Things such as “earlier than”, “later than”, “close” and many others do not make any sense when applied between God and another thing. There are still relations that do not refer to space or time, certainly, but these will invariably draw comparisons between God and other things. And there is nothing that can be compared to God, for he is infinite and necessary, whereas everything else is finite and possible. “There is no relation between either knowledge and sweetness or between clemency and bitterness, though all of them fall under the supreme genus quality. How then could there subsist a relation between Him … and any of the things created by Him, given the immense difference between them”. (378) Maimonides’ claim is that for two things to be connected by a relation, they must be similar in some respect, and that none of God’s creations are similar with God at all, given His infinite, simple, and necessary existence.
Action is the fifth and final positive attribute, according to Maimonides, and unlike the others, we can be predicated of God. “This kind of attribute is remote from the essence of the thing of which it is predicated. For this reason it is permitted that this kind should be predicated of God”. (378) Nothing about predicating actions to God makes him a multiplicity or contradicts his essence, so it is possible to do so. It is critical to understand that God’s actions are unlike any other, for they do not arise from that which subsists in the essence, like a man whose hunger causes him to perform the act of eating. Divine action arises from His essence itself, as a matter of necessity.
The last paragraph in Chapter 52 is a summary, as well as an explanation of how his theory affects theology. When the Torah makes mention of God as being merciful, angry, or other such qualities, rather than being about God, these statements refer to His actions. Since a given act of God is situated in space and time, and finite like his creations, it can be talked about in the normal way. But we cannot attribute anything to God directly, save for these actions, lest we fall into error.