More on Descartes: His Second "Proof"

[lhynard]

My third ever entry on this blog had to do (in part) with René Descartes and his famous Cogito, ergo sum.[1] I have referred back to that entry many times in discussions here about epistemology, how my belief in my own existence is (after believing in logic) the second most secure of all my beliefs.[2]While I highly respect Descartes - he's the

Comments

[essius]

Jacques Maritain, in The Degrees of Knowledge, dismembers the Cartesian analysis (and other modern views, including notably Kant and Husserl) and shows how that of which we are first and most certainly aware is not the Cogito, but the sensible, material world. Only in a reflexive mental act do we infer the concepts and psychological states on which all nondiscursive mental acts are based, as well as the bearer of those concepts and states. The epistemology or, better, the noetic of Thomas Aquinas and Neothomists like Maritain far outstrips the soundness of moderns like Descartes, Spinoza and Malebranche.

[anosognosia]

"Only in a reflexive mental act do we infer the concepts and psychological states on which all nondiscursive mental acts are based, as well as the bearer of those concepts and states."

Yes this is Descartes' position as well. He does not advance the cogito through an immediate act of a priori reasoning, as does Spinoza for the concept of substance for example, but rather shows how it followed "in a reflexive mental act" from sensible experience.

"...shows how that of which we are first and most certainly aware is not the Cogito, but the sensible, material world."The Cartesian objection here is in line with most medieval thought, and indeed back to Aristotle and perhaps Plato, in observing a conflation in your remark between "first" and "most certainly." For something to be the first object of cognition in the order of nature is not the same as for something to be the first object of cognition in the order of fact, or we may say in regards to their transcendental rather than temporal nature. The fact that we are (temporally)

[lhynard]

Thanks for posting. I was hoping that some philosophy folk would pipe in for this, because I am admittedly untrained in the field.

I'll have to see if the philo group gets to Maritain eventually. They are going chronologically, so it could be a long while, since they started with Plato and such ten years ago. When did he write?

As anosognosia mentions, I don't think that "first" and "most certainly" are synonyms. Like all humans, I admittedly was first aware of the material world, but from a very early age, I was certain of my own existence and, having now thought about it, am far more certain of that than anything I perceive by my senses. I think the cogito itself sound; I just take issue with his next leap to dualism of substances.

[anosognosia]

I don't think there's any significant difference between the three on these points

[lhynard]

Yes, we were discussing last night how much Malebranche and Spinoza are really saying the same sort of thing. (If I recall correctly, one of their contemporaries argued such, which really annoyed Malebranche, because he did not want to be associated with Spinoza.)

I recall Descartes giving the example of the eye, but I guess I missed the occasionalist bent within it. Thanks for pointing that out and for commenting in general.

[anosognosia]

Yeah, Leibniz famously argued that and maintained that his philosophy was the only way for rationalism to avoid being Spinozist. Although there's a good question as to whether he ultimately ended up saying anything substantially different either