Naturalism vs. Supernaturalism
Here is the first essay of the semester for history of philosophy. Not too great, but it is decent at least and should garner me a good enough grade at least.
In the history of human thought there exists a tendency to account for the contents of our experience with either natural or supernatural explanations. From the macrocosmic to the microcosmic, there have been a variety of both natural and supernatural explanations for various phenomena. Everything from the origin of the universe to the behavior of human beings have explained away using various means, both natural and supernatural, in an attempt to fashion a coherent system of knowledge concerning the world. However, these systems of knowledge rarely are compatible with each other.
There is a special and prevalent conflict that brews between naturalistic and supernatural systems of knowledge. From the time of ancient Greece, and no doubt prior, this conflict has manifested itself and continues to do so even today. Within the past century, the conflict has drifted more away from the domain of the questions concerning the events of the natural world and into questions of morality and ethics. However, while naturalistic science may have wrested control over the explanation of natural phenomena, the struggle is far from completed, for there exists still a lingering spectre of past ages of supernatural explanation and divine command.
Perhaps the most well-known and commonly debated issue of conflict between natural science and supernatural mysticism is the issue of origination. Whence has the universe sprung? Has it a point of origin or not? If so, what, or whom, created it? These are such questions that are dealt with concerning the idea of origination. In all fairness though, technically if the universe did have an original starting point, it would have by definition been “supernatural” as the birth of the universe happened outside of the natural order of it. This, however, is not central to the debate. The question revolves around the explanation for the origin of the universe, supposing of course one accepts an origin. The metaphysician or theologian would deem it necessary that we have some entity, either personal or impersonal, to account for the creation of this universe. The logician or scientist, however, would find no such necessity. The logician would likely, in accordance with Occam’s razor, find the addition of such entities into the equation unpalatable, whereas the scientist would find insufficient grounds to infer the existence of such an entity.
Often as a corollary of the debate of origination there is the more particular debate of human origination. Both of these two questions can often be lumped in together, for in many theological traditions they are both constituents of a single event such as Christianity’s genesis. The questions are, however, logically distinct and thus have been treated as such in this paper. Creationists would have us believe that there is a supreme creator-deity that by his own fiat fashioned human beings in his own image and placed them into the world much like a fine craftsman would carve chess pieces into his likeness and place them onto a homemade chess board. This theory, if it can be so called, flies in the face of scientific evidence that points to a gradual and purposeless evolution of life that sprung from various chemical reactions which were the results of a long series of causal events that link back to the prior question of universal origination. In this case, as in some others, there has been an attempt by theologians to create compatibility in light of the compelling evidence contrary to theological doctrine. Liberal theologians, as well as most of theists, nowadays will accept evolution so long as they qualify it with the idea that their god or creator-deity set evolution into motion with the divine end of forming human beings.
While there is still some dispute concerning the matters of origination, both of the universal and human sort, most of the contemporary problems resolve around ethical issues. Essentially there is one single, simple yet profound, question which is at the focus of this debate, viz. “What is good?” Moreover, as a necessary corollary of this question, where is goodness derived from? How are we to distinguish a good act from a bad act? Is good a derivative of desire, that which produces the most happiness, that which is rational, or that which is prescribed by divine command?
Orthodox theology asserts that morality is defined by God and/or can be deduced from natural principles; for, if God created the best of all possible worlds, it should only make sense that by following the so-called “laws of nature” or “natural laws” (or as Bentham in my opinion rightly suggested, “Nonsense on stilts”) that we act rightly. There are logical and ethical difficulties presented by this doctrine. The first of these logical and epistemological enormities to consider is how is it we, as humans, have come to be aware of the divine edicts of our creator-deity. It seems implausible, as Hume pointed out, that there had been such marvelous revelations by God, for we have no experience with such phenomena ourselves. This, of course, does not negate the possibility of such an occurrence, but simply implicates that we cannot express any certainty either way; we can only give an approximation of probability and, in this case, there seems to be little evidence in favor of a positive conclusion.
The next problem presented with the traditional theological view of morality concerns itself with the nature of moral obligation itself. Granted that science cannot decide moral questions itself, as it can only show us the means to an end, naturalistic philosophy, which still stands in opposition to supernatural mysticism, has provided man with various secular systems of ethics. If we are to ask, for instance, why ought we follow the divine edicts of God, we are to be given various answers of the sort of which they cannot be verified. Furthermore, there are numerous different religions and deities, each of which proclaims to be the sole repositories of the Ultimate Truth. Logically this leads us to conclude that only one of the several, if even that, can possibly be true. So it seems that to acquiesce to the divine orders of any deity leads us into logical problems which seemingly can only be resolved by an emotional or pragmatic decision.
It will be objected, of course, by some theologians that while perhaps the essence of God cannot be entirely apprehended by the human mind, we can by ways of observation of the natural state of affairs in this “best of possible worlds” deduce an ethic which would be smiled upon by God. However, what passes of natural in one culture or sect may very well be considered unnatural in another. This is an obvious truism to any person who is at all versed in history or anthropology. There is also a very important metaphysical objection to this doctrine of natural law which was expounded by John Stuart Mill, viz. that nothing that happens within our experience is unnatural in the most strictest of senses as everything occurs as a part of some descriptive, in distinction to prescriptive, natural law. To bid that people conform to the laws of nature when they have no choice or possibility of doing otherwise is nonsense. Therefore, it naturally follows, that all the connotations of “natural” and “unnatural” are subjective and dependent upon social norms.
There are numerous other examples of disharmony between the supernatural and natural systems of knowledge and explanation, however, both time and space are limited and they cannot be fully or adequately discussed here. Man has first looked to invisible anthropomorphic entities to explain away natural phenomena, and then next attempted to metaphysically account for such occurrences, and now, with the adoption of positivism, look only to the phenomena itself. Change is an arduous process in human thinking and many of the antiquated doctrines of the old age cannot be shaken off in one fell swoop and during this process of change, conflict is inevitable.
In the history of human thought there exists a tendency to account for the contents of our experience with either natural or supernatural explanations. From the macrocosmic to the microcosmic, there have been a variety of both natural and supernatural explanations for various phenomena. Everything from the origin of the universe to the behavior of human beings have explained away using various means, both natural and supernatural, in an attempt to fashion a coherent system of knowledge concerning the world. However, these systems of knowledge rarely are compatible with each other.
There is a special and prevalent conflict that brews between naturalistic and supernatural systems of knowledge. From the time of ancient Greece, and no doubt prior, this conflict has manifested itself and continues to do so even today. Within the past century, the conflict has drifted more away from the domain of the questions concerning the events of the natural world and into questions of morality and ethics. However, while naturalistic science may have wrested control over the explanation of natural phenomena, the struggle is far from completed, for there exists still a lingering spectre of past ages of supernatural explanation and divine command.
Perhaps the most well-known and commonly debated issue of conflict between natural science and supernatural mysticism is the issue of origination. Whence has the universe sprung? Has it a point of origin or not? If so, what, or whom, created it? These are such questions that are dealt with concerning the idea of origination. In all fairness though, technically if the universe did have an original starting point, it would have by definition been “supernatural” as the birth of the universe happened outside of the natural order of it. This, however, is not central to the debate. The question revolves around the explanation for the origin of the universe, supposing of course one accepts an origin. The metaphysician or theologian would deem it necessary that we have some entity, either personal or impersonal, to account for the creation of this universe. The logician or scientist, however, would find no such necessity. The logician would likely, in accordance with Occam’s razor, find the addition of such entities into the equation unpalatable, whereas the scientist would find insufficient grounds to infer the existence of such an entity.
Often as a corollary of the debate of origination there is the more particular debate of human origination. Both of these two questions can often be lumped in together, for in many theological traditions they are both constituents of a single event such as Christianity’s genesis. The questions are, however, logically distinct and thus have been treated as such in this paper. Creationists would have us believe that there is a supreme creator-deity that by his own fiat fashioned human beings in his own image and placed them into the world much like a fine craftsman would carve chess pieces into his likeness and place them onto a homemade chess board. This theory, if it can be so called, flies in the face of scientific evidence that points to a gradual and purposeless evolution of life that sprung from various chemical reactions which were the results of a long series of causal events that link back to the prior question of universal origination. In this case, as in some others, there has been an attempt by theologians to create compatibility in light of the compelling evidence contrary to theological doctrine. Liberal theologians, as well as most of theists, nowadays will accept evolution so long as they qualify it with the idea that their god or creator-deity set evolution into motion with the divine end of forming human beings.
While there is still some dispute concerning the matters of origination, both of the universal and human sort, most of the contemporary problems resolve around ethical issues. Essentially there is one single, simple yet profound, question which is at the focus of this debate, viz. “What is good?” Moreover, as a necessary corollary of this question, where is goodness derived from? How are we to distinguish a good act from a bad act? Is good a derivative of desire, that which produces the most happiness, that which is rational, or that which is prescribed by divine command?
Orthodox theology asserts that morality is defined by God and/or can be deduced from natural principles; for, if God created the best of all possible worlds, it should only make sense that by following the so-called “laws of nature” or “natural laws” (or as Bentham in my opinion rightly suggested, “Nonsense on stilts”) that we act rightly. There are logical and ethical difficulties presented by this doctrine. The first of these logical and epistemological enormities to consider is how is it we, as humans, have come to be aware of the divine edicts of our creator-deity. It seems implausible, as Hume pointed out, that there had been such marvelous revelations by God, for we have no experience with such phenomena ourselves. This, of course, does not negate the possibility of such an occurrence, but simply implicates that we cannot express any certainty either way; we can only give an approximation of probability and, in this case, there seems to be little evidence in favor of a positive conclusion.
The next problem presented with the traditional theological view of morality concerns itself with the nature of moral obligation itself. Granted that science cannot decide moral questions itself, as it can only show us the means to an end, naturalistic philosophy, which still stands in opposition to supernatural mysticism, has provided man with various secular systems of ethics. If we are to ask, for instance, why ought we follow the divine edicts of God, we are to be given various answers of the sort of which they cannot be verified. Furthermore, there are numerous different religions and deities, each of which proclaims to be the sole repositories of the Ultimate Truth. Logically this leads us to conclude that only one of the several, if even that, can possibly be true. So it seems that to acquiesce to the divine orders of any deity leads us into logical problems which seemingly can only be resolved by an emotional or pragmatic decision.
It will be objected, of course, by some theologians that while perhaps the essence of God cannot be entirely apprehended by the human mind, we can by ways of observation of the natural state of affairs in this “best of possible worlds” deduce an ethic which would be smiled upon by God. However, what passes of natural in one culture or sect may very well be considered unnatural in another. This is an obvious truism to any person who is at all versed in history or anthropology. There is also a very important metaphysical objection to this doctrine of natural law which was expounded by John Stuart Mill, viz. that nothing that happens within our experience is unnatural in the most strictest of senses as everything occurs as a part of some descriptive, in distinction to prescriptive, natural law. To bid that people conform to the laws of nature when they have no choice or possibility of doing otherwise is nonsense. Therefore, it naturally follows, that all the connotations of “natural” and “unnatural” are subjective and dependent upon social norms.
There are numerous other examples of disharmony between the supernatural and natural systems of knowledge and explanation, however, both time and space are limited and they cannot be fully or adequately discussed here. Man has first looked to invisible anthropomorphic entities to explain away natural phenomena, and then next attempted to metaphysically account for such occurrences, and now, with the adoption of positivism, look only to the phenomena itself. Change is an arduous process in human thinking and many of the antiquated doctrines of the old age cannot be shaken off in one fell swoop and during this process of change, conflict is inevitable.