An increasing number of polls show that Vladimir Putin will come out victorious within the first round of the upcoming presidential elections in Russia. The pace at which his popularity is growing raises a number of questions although it is not that surprising if given enough thought. It's quite clear that his image dominates the media space, which is a severe violation of the election laws. Putin can be constantly seen on television, his articles are published in the top newspapers of the country, he gives speeches and attends meetings with potential electorate, all of which is masked as the Prime Minister's duties. There is no denying that all of that exposure contributes greatly to his growing popularity. In any case, such unfair advantage is not the only way in which Putin differs from his opponents.
First, today Putin presents himself as a non-partisan, non-ideological candidate. He has taken steps to drastically distance himself from United Russia, although hasn't unveiled his personal electoral program. This has allowed Putin to attract people with dramatically different views and from a broad range of social layers and groups. Such tactic has proved quite effective for him, considering that the social structure of Russia is still a work-in-progress and much of its population can't be defined as a certain social group or class. Naturally Putin's electorate are not exactly supporters - they are his admirers and fans, hence even his failures are perceived by them as partial or hidden success.
Second - unlike his previous electoral campaigns, this time Putin is viewed by different voters in drastically different roles. For one part current Prime Minister represents stability. The other part of his electorate sees him as an embodiment of future reforms. At the pro-Putin rally on February 23d in Moscow, both slogans for stability and for reforms could be spotted. Some people see Putin as a Russian nationalist (in the Western-Eurpoean sense) while others - as a president who protects numerous national republics within the country from the overarching Russian chauvinism. Today his ability to attract voters with such opposite views plays in his favor, although quite soon it can become his major weakness.
By the middle of Putin's first/third term half of his supporters would join his opposition, since one part or the other would be inevitably disappointed by his rule. The organizers of the upper mentioned pro-Putin rally assured me that if Putin doesn't choose the path of democratization and reforms in the next couple of years they would simply “throw him down” themselves. It's clear therefore, that today Putin has mobilized his electorate simply to win the elections. When he does become president, Vladimir Putin would have no choice but to seek support with the social groups that today have joined sides with his opponents.
Third, so far Putin has been able to maintain his reputation as a politician that never betrays “his own” and values loyalty more than professionalism. In many cases his future victory depends today on the resources of the people whom he has personally placed at the top echelons of the country years back. However, it would be almost impossible for Vladimir Putin not to let go of many of “his people” - the demand for changes is too big. Despite the recent efforts, no system of replacing previous generations of officials with “new blood” has been created. Moreover, for many officials - losing their position today means inevitable legal prosecution.
As a result Putin is openly refusing to unveil his plans related to staffing, simply promising to renew the government. It's quite unclear how he would be replacing the old with new. If Putin decides to use drastic measures and do it bluntly he will inevitably turn many of his formerly loyal supporters in the government against himself. If it is just one Yuri Luzhkov going against it, the regime has nothing to fear. But what if there are hundreds of such Luzhkov's?
In the near future Putin will be facing a truly difficult presidential term, filled with hidden dangers and unpredictable obstacles. Although it seems that the election would legitimize his power, it would not return Putin and the country to the situation of 2004. Historically its the candidates who lose the elections that define the political agenda of the actual president. It seems that it would be true this time as well and after March 4th the winner of the elections would not have the usual monopoly when it comes to power. In this case Putin's victory would be not as complete as it might seem, while his opponents official loss would not be a real loss.
Published in “Vedomosti” on February 27, 2012
Translated to English by Gennady Gladkov
Read in Russian:
http://n-zlobin.livejournal.com/67813.html