Доктор, я параноик?
Понравился комментарий к статье в Economist о внезапно всплывших огромных убытках UBS.
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11090218
Краткое содержание для неэкономистов и нелюбителей читать многабукаф: наш синтетический финансовый мир, давно уже оторвавшийся от реальной жизни, может вскорости ждать пиздец масштаба Великой Депрессии. Рынок ипотечных бумаг может быть лишь первой ласточкой. Причина тому - безграничная жадность банкиров, помноженная на их блестящие мозги, которые позволяют обходить любые правила и механизмы контроля рисков.
"I am sure this reflects the situation in most of the major banks, with top management told the risks are matched or hedged and nay sayers over ruled because the trading profits kept growing. Funny how all the big banks' clever trading rooms made huge profits all the time. Pass the parcel trading has a remarkable capacity to hide risk and values, especially when it is notionally off balance sheet for regulatory purposes, and when every winning dealer gets rewarded with a super bonus.
The real worry is that we are all looking at the problems with ABS/CDO's now and nobody dares to look at the much larger financial and commodities derivatives exposures where the same illusion of matched or hedged exposures is maintained and only minimal net positions (if any) are used in notional capital adequacy requirements. The banking system's exposure to these is in USD 1000trillions, hardly any of which can be closed out because there is too much trade driven by overnight corrections to mark to market differences. All the dealing rooms continue to make profits by not closing out losses through the simple process of balancing trades by writing new synthetic "equivalents".
Don't even think about delivery risk in this synthetic world, there is an assumption that this will never be a problem as long as we all keep dancing. Sounds familiar?
The geniuses that come up with these products call them exotic which disguises the truly synthetic nature of the alleged equivalents on which much of the balance in the major banks' derivatives trading books is based.
Unfortunately there isn't enough wealth in the world to provide a capital base to support the total derivatives trades exposures so at some stage they will have to be reduced. That is when the true trading losses will become evident and an awful lot of real money payments will have to be made.
I have a serious concern, given the huge write-offs in the relatively mundane CDO exposures, that the real costs of closing down these other great illusions of our time will bring several solid institutions to the government (Fed or BoE etc) not for liquidity but to take over their entire operations."
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11090218
Краткое содержание для неэкономистов и нелюбителей читать многабукаф: наш синтетический финансовый мир, давно уже оторвавшийся от реальной жизни, может вскорости ждать пиздец масштаба Великой Депрессии. Рынок ипотечных бумаг может быть лишь первой ласточкой. Причина тому - безграничная жадность банкиров, помноженная на их блестящие мозги, которые позволяют обходить любые правила и механизмы контроля рисков.
"I am sure this reflects the situation in most of the major banks, with top management told the risks are matched or hedged and nay sayers over ruled because the trading profits kept growing. Funny how all the big banks' clever trading rooms made huge profits all the time. Pass the parcel trading has a remarkable capacity to hide risk and values, especially when it is notionally off balance sheet for regulatory purposes, and when every winning dealer gets rewarded with a super bonus.
The real worry is that we are all looking at the problems with ABS/CDO's now and nobody dares to look at the much larger financial and commodities derivatives exposures where the same illusion of matched or hedged exposures is maintained and only minimal net positions (if any) are used in notional capital adequacy requirements. The banking system's exposure to these is in USD 1000trillions, hardly any of which can be closed out because there is too much trade driven by overnight corrections to mark to market differences. All the dealing rooms continue to make profits by not closing out losses through the simple process of balancing trades by writing new synthetic "equivalents".
Don't even think about delivery risk in this synthetic world, there is an assumption that this will never be a problem as long as we all keep dancing. Sounds familiar?
The geniuses that come up with these products call them exotic which disguises the truly synthetic nature of the alleged equivalents on which much of the balance in the major banks' derivatives trading books is based.
Unfortunately there isn't enough wealth in the world to provide a capital base to support the total derivatives trades exposures so at some stage they will have to be reduced. That is when the true trading losses will become evident and an awful lot of real money payments will have to be made.
I have a serious concern, given the huge write-offs in the relatively mundane CDO exposures, that the real costs of closing down these other great illusions of our time will bring several solid institutions to the government (Fed or BoE etc) not for liquidity but to take over their entire operations."