economics and philosophy
It's interesting watching the varied reactions to the surprising success of Ron Paul's campaign in the Republican party.
I've always believed that a knowledge of liberal economics is an important asset for progressives, and that certain traditions in liberal economics sincerely pursue and have something to contribute to the criticism of inegalitarian consolidations of power in our social structures. However, it strikes me that the ultimate failing point of liberal economics is in its orientation to individualism. Liberal economic criticism, where it can succeed in breaking up consolidations of power, has, by virtue of this individualism, a tendency to reduce to a state of competition between labourers or purchasers which undermines the actual results of such a criticism. For example, if some of the initiatives Paul favors met with the sort of success he pursues, such that a greater proportion of nominal capital is returned to the individuals of the middle and lower classes, we might suppose in line with his goal that this would be real capital as represented in greater purchasing power. However, competition among purchasers in the conditions of a liberal market has the result of raising the price of goods, such that prices approach a value set by what the purchaser can pay. In such a situation, the increase of funds made available to the individual by the success of liberal economic criticism would, ironically, not entail any increase in real capital, as in increased purchasing power. We see this dynamic for example in the price of housing.
It seems from this that progressive goals can only be met through the organization and cooperation of the labourer or purchaser, as a remedy against the competition within these groups which drives down wages, drives up prices, and prevents these groups, via the correction of the market, from accruing any real capital. The counter-objection from the liberal tradition is that any such shift in social-economic activity from the individual to the organization is an alienation of the individual's interests and the oppression of the individual to an agency distant from his or her concerns. To the extent that both sides of this issue raise legitimate concerns, the dialectic of social-economic development is manifested in this tension between the individual, whose logic represents a criticism of the alienating logic of the collective, yet whose dominance ironically results in a war of all against all which is self-undermining; and the collective, whose logic represents a criticism of the self-undermining conflict among individuals, yet whose dominance ironically alienates social-economic activity from the aims of the populace of actual persons.
Philosophers ought to recognize this dialectic as another instance of the problem of the one and the many. Probably what socialists found so interesting in Hegel was his careful diagnosis of this dialectic, and his attempt to synthesize the antithesis of the one/individual and many/collective. It seems that this is still the problem we face today, in our own political situation.
I've always believed that a knowledge of liberal economics is an important asset for progressives, and that certain traditions in liberal economics sincerely pursue and have something to contribute to the criticism of inegalitarian consolidations of power in our social structures. However, it strikes me that the ultimate failing point of liberal economics is in its orientation to individualism. Liberal economic criticism, where it can succeed in breaking up consolidations of power, has, by virtue of this individualism, a tendency to reduce to a state of competition between labourers or purchasers which undermines the actual results of such a criticism. For example, if some of the initiatives Paul favors met with the sort of success he pursues, such that a greater proportion of nominal capital is returned to the individuals of the middle and lower classes, we might suppose in line with his goal that this would be real capital as represented in greater purchasing power. However, competition among purchasers in the conditions of a liberal market has the result of raising the price of goods, such that prices approach a value set by what the purchaser can pay. In such a situation, the increase of funds made available to the individual by the success of liberal economic criticism would, ironically, not entail any increase in real capital, as in increased purchasing power. We see this dynamic for example in the price of housing.
It seems from this that progressive goals can only be met through the organization and cooperation of the labourer or purchaser, as a remedy against the competition within these groups which drives down wages, drives up prices, and prevents these groups, via the correction of the market, from accruing any real capital. The counter-objection from the liberal tradition is that any such shift in social-economic activity from the individual to the organization is an alienation of the individual's interests and the oppression of the individual to an agency distant from his or her concerns. To the extent that both sides of this issue raise legitimate concerns, the dialectic of social-economic development is manifested in this tension between the individual, whose logic represents a criticism of the alienating logic of the collective, yet whose dominance ironically results in a war of all against all which is self-undermining; and the collective, whose logic represents a criticism of the self-undermining conflict among individuals, yet whose dominance ironically alienates social-economic activity from the aims of the populace of actual persons.
Philosophers ought to recognize this dialectic as another instance of the problem of the one and the many. Probably what socialists found so interesting in Hegel was his careful diagnosis of this dialectic, and his attempt to synthesize the antithesis of the one/individual and many/collective. It seems that this is still the problem we face today, in our own political situation.