Addressing the immortality wing of the Transhumanist cult

[nanikore]

Inside the cult of transhumanism lay the cult of machine-aided immortality. They think that they could somehow transfer their consciousness into a machine and live forever that way

Comments

[unnamed525]

What's the argument that consciousness requires a biological substrate?

[nanikore]

This goes back to my previous argument regarding how a conscious AI is impossible. If something is not biological then it needs some kind of programming, and something that's programmed couldn't be conscious.

[unnamed525]

I don't see why a program couldn't be sufficiently complex to allow for self-reflection.

[nanikore]

Even before self-reflection could happen there has to be apprehension of meaning. What the Chinese Room has already shown is that the appearance of apprehension via a programmed task is not apprehension.

[peamasii]

Let's assume that we have the technology to replicate a part of the brain with a nanocomputer performing the same identical functions given the input/output exchange.

What if you then replace a part of the brain with an electronic circuit which performs the exact same functions? Does that reduce your sense of identity or idea of the self? No, as the signals coming in and going out will be identical as before. Then if you continue replacing each brain center sequentially... does it remove your subjective sense of self? Does it redefine your identity gradually? Please explain what is happening when you do this.

[nanikore]

"Exact same function" is an assumption that ignores gestalt conceptions of the mind. The inevitable gaps in functional assumptions have been discussed in another thread. The short of that is there is no guarantee of an exhaustive functional model due to underdetermination.

Let's for the sake of discussion ignore the above question. It does not alter the final answer.

A frog which is boiled slowly would not feel its demise. The subject would not actively feel his consciousness ebbing. Unlike dementia patients who could actually report a loss in cognitive function, the slow death would not be felt. We lose brain cells every day without them being replaced, unlike the theoretical Ship of Theseus cyborg which keeps going until it turns into a p-zombie. This resultant p-zombie would exhibit the after-image, a shadow, a simulation of a formerly conscious being instead of being one.

[peamasii]

It wouldn't be a p-zombie, it would be the same person with a replaced brain, experiencing the same experiences they normally do. If the brain functions the same way it is conscious the same way whether it's made of silicone or of real neurons. Here's why: the activity of the mind (i.e. consciousness) is dependent on various sub-systems which reflect internally their own states of processing. The substrate question is relevant only while we are reducingconsciousness to the sense of the self, in saying that reducing it to a circuit cannot possibly have a sense of self. I don't disagree with that, but I don't think the reduction is possible. Say we replace the brain centers with artifically-grown miniature brains. They are hypothetically raised in an environment which simulates exactly the environment of the self: same memories, same genetic traits, same experiences. Then they are grafted into the brain one by one. The resulting being will be conscious of the self the same way the original person was conscious of themselves: the same

[nanikore]

You ignored the first paragraph of my previous rejoinder.

Artificial neurons

[dragonlord66]

arstechnica.co.uk/gadgets/2016/08/ibm-phase-change-neurons/

If you complete the above link it will take you to a news story where they have just made artificial neurons in silicon.

assuming like for like doctrine, if two neurons behave identically then it doesn't matter what they are made of for the system they are part of.

Re: Artificial neurons

[nanikore]

We've been through this before in our previous thread.

How do you guarantee exhaustiveness of functional models in the light of scientific underdetermination?

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-underdetermination/

Re: Artificial neurons

[dragonlord66]

if two things are functionally identical then in terms of function are they the same?

Re: Artificial neurons

[nanikore]

The problem with that question is that not everything should be or could be defined by observable function.

For a crude, non-technical example, let's take the case of two people who do exactly the same things but with slightly different motives or attitudes. These differences could be so subtle as to be practically undetectable. One person could be doing something out of the goodness of his heart, while the other wants to appear charitable to others, or even appear charitable to himself in a form of self-deception. The two men would appear to be functionally identical when placed under normal observation.

Psychological events may be even more underdetermined than purported physiological "causal chains".