(no subject)
I've been watching the whole French EU constitution vote with some interest. Passions are definitely running high, and now that defeat appears imminent, I have some vague thoughts on what this means.
(I know I have a couple French citizens on my f-list, so y'all take what I say with a grain of "he's just an American" *g*)
As much as I despise Chirac and what I consider his perpetual opportunism, I think this time, he may just have a point. France is in danger of relegating itself and the EU to a lesser role in the future. Not a nonentity -- even without a constitution, the EU still wields considerable influence. But the current mindset doesn't look good for any future propositions for an EU constitution. It points to an old, almost moribund, attitude toward the possibilites offered by anything beyond basic strategic alliances amongst the European countries. Had the EU not rushed to include several, shall we say, less-than-wealthy countries, the situation might be different. But here we are, and unless the EU wants to 'uninvite' some of its members, the current incarnation is a reality that must be dealt with.
"I'd rather be an American than a European," one man was quoted as saying, an assertion the writer calls, in the dryest of tones, "unheard-of." The sentiment takes on a bizarre surrealism when one considers that the one country benefitting the most from further forestalling of an adopted EU constitution is clearly the United States (though China and Japan aren't far behind.) America will reap what the non voters sowed. Without a truly monolithic EU, America's economic clout will face little threat.
This isn't an irreparable setback. The European Union still exists. The constitution can still be modified and resubmitted for referendum. But the very nature of the resistance betokens stormy seas ahead for the EU. The nature of the EU, despite the superficially expansive internationalism, is pure protectionism. Europe, dislodged of late from its perch as the pre-eminent economic and military region, sought out the sort of geographical solidarity that hasn't been viable for a half a millinneum. Not since the Middle Ages, when the influence of the Catholic Church waxed and the endless wars between the secular leadership resembled nothing so much as intermural squabbling has Europe seemed particularly united. This is due in no small part to the waning influences of both the Church and the nobility. Without the Hapsburg influence drawing everything together in a definable web, without the privileged classes influencing the economic and military fortunes of entire populaces through strategic personal alliances and backroom bickering, the divergent countries of Europe became more nationalistic. Patriotism was a central theme of the Revolutionary periods of France and England. It would have been considered an oddity, if not outright insanity, 400 years earlier. Even the Hundred Years War was little more than a very bloody squabble between nobles who were into fratricide, parricide and general incestuous imbroglios. Sure it was between "England" and "France." But only on paper -- or, rather, on the parchments that the writs of nobility were commited to.
The resistance, however, demonstrates a certain intractable, but quite understandable, self-interest. France -- and, I suspect, England, if it ever comes to referendum there -- has emphatically declared that it will not submit to a union that threatens to alter the self-assurance of their system. This is not necessarily a bad thing -- change for the sake of change is no more desirable than stagnation for the sake of comfort. In essence, the French aren't rejection the EU constitution so much as they are rejecting a future they are already looking askance at. The pre-existing surge of xenophobia amongst the extremists, and the general discontent with the effect of immigrants on the economic (and social!) system provided an unmistakeable harbinger of what would happen in the constitution vote. The French are deeply disconcerted by the potential of the poorer EU countries to provide cheaper (and more industrious -- without the French socialist system in control, workers willing to do 50, 60, 70 hour work weeks will almost certainly be in abundance in the more poverty-stricken areas of the EU) labor. Sure, many of the pundits couch their objections in lofty terms of "unbridled capitalism" and "socialist protection of the worker," but it still comes down to an interest in protecting their own way of life. Who can blame them, really? I'd be tempted to do the same thing in their shoes. But -- and you knew there was a 'but' -- herein lies the irony. The EU's goal is to create a formidable and cohesive economic force. The combined economic potential of the European Union countries is certainly a match for that of NAFTA or APEC. But this is one of those cases where the old homily about a chain and its weakest link is quite apt. The "weakest link" isn't so much a specific country as the concessions made to a specific country in order for the constitution to be ratified. Since it has to be ratified unanimously, it must find a point where all members can agree, where the objections are addressed, if not actualy wholesale, at least enough that grudging acceptance is possible. And for every point of protectionism that a country wins, the potential economic clout of the Union weakens. Protesting against capitalism bodes ill indeed for a union that hopes to become powerful in the essentially capalistic world markets. Socialism simply doesn't work on such a scale, and even if it could be coaxed and tweaked, it would still require all trading partners to agree on the same basic principles for it to be effective -- because the GNP of one country (organization) isn't going to be 'adjusted' to compensate for the fact that another country (organization) is operating by different rules. And hate or love capitalism, it is inherently more profitable simply because that's the very raison d'etre of a capitalistic system -- profit. That's how America rose to prominence in the post-WW2 era. That's how the Japan miracle came about. And that's what the future seems to hold for any entity aspiring to challenge for economic pre-eminence in the age of multinationalism.
Ironically, the philosophical tendrils that eventually flourished to become the EU and the waxing power of both the U.S. and Asia (most notably Japan) both sprung from the horror of the 2nd World War. WW2 galvanized a moribund U.S. economy and military, and the aftermath gave Stalinistic Russia spoils of war that would provide the ore to forge the Iron Curtain, leading to the Cold War and the subsequent arms build-up while Europe was still struggling to recover from the devastation. Even with the substantial aid provided by the U.S. (billions and billions of dollars in an era when a million dollars was still wealth beyond the dreams of avarice for most people), Europe still needed time to rebuild. Germany, caught in the epic tug-of-war between the West and the East, took 40 years to fully recover, a process that began anew to some extent with reunification (and provides an almost-perfect microcosmic picture of the current tension between the established powers and the new, poorer members of the EU. But only "almost" -- the political vagaries are almost reversed here.)
Interestingly, it may be unspoken (maybe even verboten to acknowledge? not being French, I couldn't say), but I strongly suspect that one of the greatest fears is that Germany (France's foe of old), with its approach to economic progress relying quite heavily on the American model, will eclipse the more insular and relaxed France. And that would not be an unreasonable worry. As usual, it's all about values. It's the rare American who wouldn't love to work under the French system. Better hours, better social protections, better vacations... But what benefits the individual is often a mixed-bag for the larger corporate and economic structure.
So the EU's existence is predicated upon the realization that unity brings strength -- a realization made imminent not only by the devastation of war, but the inevitable surge to power amongst those relatively untouched by it (i.e. America.) But the fact that the French (and the Dutch, for that matter, amongst others) resist hearkens to the fact that Europe has been growing steadily apart since the dawn of the Age of Discovery and the growth of the merchant class and the realization that countries could control their own economic destinies as a national unit.
We all know the battlecry: Vive la Revolution! Or, better: Vive la resistance!
But this time, the resistance could cost them dearly indeed. The greatest mistake the French monarchy made wasn't its oppression of its own citizens -- monarchs had been oppressing their own citizens for centuries. The mistake it made was supporting the American Revolution to spite the English (and, yes, I've heard all the arguments about how it was altruism, but that's a less-than-compelling argument for why the nobility jumped in the fray.) Once the discontented French subjects saw revolution in action, the ideas they had passed along to the Americans returned to them as realities, and from that moment on, the French monarchy was doomed. The lesson here is, perhaps, an oblique one, but important nonetheless -- there's always a high price to pay for nationalism. Nationalism made America powerful...but that, too, came at a price. Our economic model made the country rich...but, as I said before, how many of us wouldn't prefer as individuals to work under the French system?
(I know I have a couple French citizens on my f-list, so y'all take what I say with a grain of "he's just an American" *g*)
As much as I despise Chirac and what I consider his perpetual opportunism, I think this time, he may just have a point. France is in danger of relegating itself and the EU to a lesser role in the future. Not a nonentity -- even without a constitution, the EU still wields considerable influence. But the current mindset doesn't look good for any future propositions for an EU constitution. It points to an old, almost moribund, attitude toward the possibilites offered by anything beyond basic strategic alliances amongst the European countries. Had the EU not rushed to include several, shall we say, less-than-wealthy countries, the situation might be different. But here we are, and unless the EU wants to 'uninvite' some of its members, the current incarnation is a reality that must be dealt with.
"I'd rather be an American than a European," one man was quoted as saying, an assertion the writer calls, in the dryest of tones, "unheard-of." The sentiment takes on a bizarre surrealism when one considers that the one country benefitting the most from further forestalling of an adopted EU constitution is clearly the United States (though China and Japan aren't far behind.) America will reap what the non voters sowed. Without a truly monolithic EU, America's economic clout will face little threat.
This isn't an irreparable setback. The European Union still exists. The constitution can still be modified and resubmitted for referendum. But the very nature of the resistance betokens stormy seas ahead for the EU. The nature of the EU, despite the superficially expansive internationalism, is pure protectionism. Europe, dislodged of late from its perch as the pre-eminent economic and military region, sought out the sort of geographical solidarity that hasn't been viable for a half a millinneum. Not since the Middle Ages, when the influence of the Catholic Church waxed and the endless wars between the secular leadership resembled nothing so much as intermural squabbling has Europe seemed particularly united. This is due in no small part to the waning influences of both the Church and the nobility. Without the Hapsburg influence drawing everything together in a definable web, without the privileged classes influencing the economic and military fortunes of entire populaces through strategic personal alliances and backroom bickering, the divergent countries of Europe became more nationalistic. Patriotism was a central theme of the Revolutionary periods of France and England. It would have been considered an oddity, if not outright insanity, 400 years earlier. Even the Hundred Years War was little more than a very bloody squabble between nobles who were into fratricide, parricide and general incestuous imbroglios. Sure it was between "England" and "France." But only on paper -- or, rather, on the parchments that the writs of nobility were commited to.
The resistance, however, demonstrates a certain intractable, but quite understandable, self-interest. France -- and, I suspect, England, if it ever comes to referendum there -- has emphatically declared that it will not submit to a union that threatens to alter the self-assurance of their system. This is not necessarily a bad thing -- change for the sake of change is no more desirable than stagnation for the sake of comfort. In essence, the French aren't rejection the EU constitution so much as they are rejecting a future they are already looking askance at. The pre-existing surge of xenophobia amongst the extremists, and the general discontent with the effect of immigrants on the economic (and social!) system provided an unmistakeable harbinger of what would happen in the constitution vote. The French are deeply disconcerted by the potential of the poorer EU countries to provide cheaper (and more industrious -- without the French socialist system in control, workers willing to do 50, 60, 70 hour work weeks will almost certainly be in abundance in the more poverty-stricken areas of the EU) labor. Sure, many of the pundits couch their objections in lofty terms of "unbridled capitalism" and "socialist protection of the worker," but it still comes down to an interest in protecting their own way of life. Who can blame them, really? I'd be tempted to do the same thing in their shoes. But -- and you knew there was a 'but' -- herein lies the irony. The EU's goal is to create a formidable and cohesive economic force. The combined economic potential of the European Union countries is certainly a match for that of NAFTA or APEC. But this is one of those cases where the old homily about a chain and its weakest link is quite apt. The "weakest link" isn't so much a specific country as the concessions made to a specific country in order for the constitution to be ratified. Since it has to be ratified unanimously, it must find a point where all members can agree, where the objections are addressed, if not actualy wholesale, at least enough that grudging acceptance is possible. And for every point of protectionism that a country wins, the potential economic clout of the Union weakens. Protesting against capitalism bodes ill indeed for a union that hopes to become powerful in the essentially capalistic world markets. Socialism simply doesn't work on such a scale, and even if it could be coaxed and tweaked, it would still require all trading partners to agree on the same basic principles for it to be effective -- because the GNP of one country (organization) isn't going to be 'adjusted' to compensate for the fact that another country (organization) is operating by different rules. And hate or love capitalism, it is inherently more profitable simply because that's the very raison d'etre of a capitalistic system -- profit. That's how America rose to prominence in the post-WW2 era. That's how the Japan miracle came about. And that's what the future seems to hold for any entity aspiring to challenge for economic pre-eminence in the age of multinationalism.
Ironically, the philosophical tendrils that eventually flourished to become the EU and the waxing power of both the U.S. and Asia (most notably Japan) both sprung from the horror of the 2nd World War. WW2 galvanized a moribund U.S. economy and military, and the aftermath gave Stalinistic Russia spoils of war that would provide the ore to forge the Iron Curtain, leading to the Cold War and the subsequent arms build-up while Europe was still struggling to recover from the devastation. Even with the substantial aid provided by the U.S. (billions and billions of dollars in an era when a million dollars was still wealth beyond the dreams of avarice for most people), Europe still needed time to rebuild. Germany, caught in the epic tug-of-war between the West and the East, took 40 years to fully recover, a process that began anew to some extent with reunification (and provides an almost-perfect microcosmic picture of the current tension between the established powers and the new, poorer members of the EU. But only "almost" -- the political vagaries are almost reversed here.)
Interestingly, it may be unspoken (maybe even verboten to acknowledge? not being French, I couldn't say), but I strongly suspect that one of the greatest fears is that Germany (France's foe of old), with its approach to economic progress relying quite heavily on the American model, will eclipse the more insular and relaxed France. And that would not be an unreasonable worry. As usual, it's all about values. It's the rare American who wouldn't love to work under the French system. Better hours, better social protections, better vacations... But what benefits the individual is often a mixed-bag for the larger corporate and economic structure.
So the EU's existence is predicated upon the realization that unity brings strength -- a realization made imminent not only by the devastation of war, but the inevitable surge to power amongst those relatively untouched by it (i.e. America.) But the fact that the French (and the Dutch, for that matter, amongst others) resist hearkens to the fact that Europe has been growing steadily apart since the dawn of the Age of Discovery and the growth of the merchant class and the realization that countries could control their own economic destinies as a national unit.
We all know the battlecry: Vive la Revolution! Or, better: Vive la resistance!
But this time, the resistance could cost them dearly indeed. The greatest mistake the French monarchy made wasn't its oppression of its own citizens -- monarchs had been oppressing their own citizens for centuries. The mistake it made was supporting the American Revolution to spite the English (and, yes, I've heard all the arguments about how it was altruism, but that's a less-than-compelling argument for why the nobility jumped in the fray.) Once the discontented French subjects saw revolution in action, the ideas they had passed along to the Americans returned to them as realities, and from that moment on, the French monarchy was doomed. The lesson here is, perhaps, an oblique one, but important nonetheless -- there's always a high price to pay for nationalism. Nationalism made America powerful...but that, too, came at a price. Our economic model made the country rich...but, as I said before, how many of us wouldn't prefer as individuals to work under the French system?