In the Preface of The Theological-Political Tractate, Benedict de Spinoza asserts the freedoms of belief and expression and then uses these freedoms to defend his analysis of Scripture and organized religion that follows. In his use of the Preface as an introduction, Spinoza seeks to attract and draw in the largest possible audience by manipulating their senses of identity both as members of the greater populace and as religious individuals. As an overview of the text as a whole, the Preface is ordered in a non-linear fashion, allowing him to more subtly defend his aims and conclusions. Throughout the Preface, Spinoza also effectively uses reverse psychology to influence the readership’s reaction to his words.
Spinoza’s main goals with the Preface of the TTP are twofold. First, he wishes to state and defend his belief that “to invest with prejudice or in any way coerce the citizen’s free judgment is altogether incompatible with the freedom of the people” and that “the peace of the commonwealth and piety depend on this freedom.” (390) However, he uses the concepts of free expression and belief mainly as a defense for the arguments he then proceeds to make against corrupt, restrictive, and misleading religious and government policy and leadership. He aims to exercise his believed right to free judgment, and shows this when he states that he has “deliberately resolved to examine Scripture afresh, conscientiously and freely, and to admit nothing as its teaching which I did not most clearly derive from it” (391) He further states that “my most urgent task has been to indicate the main false assumptions that prevail regarding religion….and then again the false assumptions regarding the right of civil authorities.” (390) Not only is Spinoza addressing the hypocrisies and contradictions he finds within religion; he is also applying his findings to the state.
However, Spinoza does not begin his treatise with a direct statement of his intentions. Rather, he starts with a description of something that does not seem immediately attached to the freedom of expression-that is, with the nature of superstition within human beings. Spinoza finds superstition to be a “madness” to which men are not only “driven by their fears” (388) but also “by nature liable” (389). It is not until after a two-page description of the universality of such superstition that Spinoza begins to connect to the larger (and more shocking) statements he makes within the Preface. He progresses to asserting that religion is a “specious title” used to “cloak the fear by which they [men] must be held in check.” (389)
At this point, however, Spinoza has still not directly condemned religious leaders. His use of the passive voice and purposeful vagueness lulls the reader into his argument instead of alienating them. His non-linear use of defense before argument is an effective tactic because it raises the likelihood of the reader to continue on into the treatise. Outright statements of beliefs that Spinoza knew to be extremely controversial would have caused some readers to throw down the treatise in anger instead of giving it a second thought.
It is also at this point that Spinoza makes his first statement in regards to the importance of legally protected “free judgment”. He uses reverse psychology, discussing the “rare good fortune” of himself and fellow citizens to live in “a commonwealth where freedom of judgment is fully granted…where nothing is esteemed dearer and more precious than freedom.” (389) Who would want to state that freedom is a bad thing?
If he had initially angered the reader, Spinoza followed up by providing his own defense of the right to hold the offending beliefs.
After stating his foremost goal (to establish the right of free judgment), Spinoza begins to exercise that right, beginning to “set forth the causes that have induced [him] to write” (390)-namely, his frustration with the Church and its questionable motives. To Spinoza, Christianity is a “religion of love, joy, peace, temperance, and honest dealing” that has become “distorted” through a “wide-spread popular attitude of mind which looks on the ministries of the Church as dignities, its offices as posts of emolument and its pastors as eminent personages.” (390) This is Spinoza’s first direct reference to corrupt leadership, stated in a indirect manner following his initial proclamation of Christianity as a loving faith.
Spinoza cautiously removes himself from the fray, however, making clear that it is not his intent to become a religious authority. Rather, his work is to be that of reason. Spinoza states that he is “completely convinced that Scripture does not in any way inhibit reason and has nothing to do with philosophy, each standing on its own footing.” (392) He asserts that “knowledge by revelation” and “natural knowledge” are “distinct….these two have nothing in common.” (392) This softens the blow he had dealt on the previous pages to the religious authorities.
As he nears the conclusion of the Preface, Spinoza fleshes out his initial assertion about the freedoms which “cannot be withheld without great danger to peace and grave harm to the entire commonwealth.” (393) As “nobody can so deprive himself of the power of self-defence as to cease to be a human being”, Spinoza concludes “that nobody can be absolutely deprived of his natural rights.” (393) Here he uses statements of solid fact instead of hypothetical arguments, again using reverse psychology to win over at least the consideration of the reader. After all, who would want to be ‘deprived’ of their rights? Who would want to cease to ‘retain’ whatever it is that makes them a human being? The reader is compelled to at least acknowledge that Spinoza’s arguments are appealing.
In his closing paragraphs, Spinoza directly addresses the readership, appealing to the values of education, individuality, and fairness in order to retain their attention. Speaking to the “learned reader”, Spinoza states that “the masses can no more be freed from their superstition than their fears” (393) and that therefore he does not “invite the common people to read this work, nor all those who are victims of the same emotional attitude.” (394) His choice of words forces the reader to ask himself-am I one of the masses, am I a ‘victim’, or am I a learned individual? There is clearly a preferable answer. Spinoza also acknowledges that he has “no reason” to expect approval, citing deep-seated “prejudices” as likely to hold sway over many individuals. Creating a similar effect as his address of the “learned reader”, these statements compel the reader to identify himself either as a prejudiced or non-prejudiced individual (again, with an obvious preference.)
Spinoza’s final statement is perhaps his strongest, snubbing his critics by stating something which seems to be completely contradictory to the theme of the Preface. He states that “If anything of what I say is deemed [by the government] to contravene the laws of our country or to be injurious to the common good, I am ready to withdraw it.” (394) This is a ludicrous offer, as Spinoza has just stated that he believes he’s fully entitled to both think as he does and express his thoughts. This is an obvious use of reverse psychology to make his point-truly, how much harm can come to a community because it protects dissention? How much power can the written word contain?
Also known as, the past few hours of my life in written form.
And there it goes
my last chance for peace