Битва при Делии. 424 BCE.
Фукидид. История Пелопоннесской войны. IV.89-101.
На русском есть старый перевод Ф.Г. Мищенко и более новый Г.А. Стратановского. Но второй в описании битвы при Делии налепил ошибок (потеряны куски текста, числа гуляют), у Мищенко тоже обнаружилась пара огрех. Поэтому описание даю по Thucydides. The Peloponnesian War / translated by Martin Hammond, with an introduction and notes by P.J. Rhodes. Oxford University Press. 2009, это издание пока больше всего понравилось. Может и лучше есть.
At the very beginning of the following winter matters were ready for the betrayal of Boeotia to the Athenian generals Hippocrates and Demosthenes, and each had their appointment to keep - Demosthenes at Siphae with his ships, and Hippocrates at Delium. But a mistake was made about the dates for their respective mobilizations, and Demosthenes, with the Acarnanians and many others of the allies in that area on board his fleet, sailed for Siphae too early. His expedition came to nothing, as the enterprise was betrayed by a Phocian from Phanoteus called Nicomachus: he told the Spartans, and they told the Boeotians. As Hippocrates was not yet there to create diversionary trouble in the country, the Boeotians brought a full levy into action, and both Siphae and Chaeroneia were secured in advance. When the conspirators in the Boeotian cities learnt of this failure, they made no revolutionary move.
Hippocrates had raised a full-scale Athenian army - calling up citizens, metics, and all foreigners then in the city - and arrived at Delium too late, when the Boeotians had already been to Siphae and left. He settled his army there and began to fortify Delium in the following way. They first dug a trench in a circle round the sanctuary and the temple, and piled up the excavated soil to form a wall, which they then secured with wooden stakes driven in on either side: they packed the interior with vine-wood cut from around the sanctuary and stones and bricks stripped from the nearby houses, using every means to raise the height of the fortification. They erected wooden towers at suitable places where no sanctuary building was available for that purpose (there had once been a colonnade there, but it had collapsed). They began construction on the third day after setting out from Athens, and worked throughout that day, the next day, and until lunchtime on the fifth day. Then, when most of the work was complete, the main force retired to a distance of just over a mile from Delium, preparatory to a return home. Most of the light-armed troops continued immediately on the way back, but the hoplites grounded their arms there and waited: Hippocrates had stayed behind to organize the garrison and direct the completion of the remaining parts of the outwork.
light-armed troops - в оригинале псилы (ψιλοὶ)
По мобилизации подняли все Афины (ἀναστήσας Ἀθηναίους πανδημεί), включая неграждан-метеков (μετοίκους) и иноземцев (ξένων).
During these days the Boeotians were gathering at Tanagra. When the contingents from all the cities had arrived, they could see that the Athenians were moving back home. Since they were no longer in Boeotia (when they grounded their arms the Athenians were just about on the border with the territory of Oropus), all the Boeotarchs, of whom there are eleven, were against giving battle except for one. Pagondas the son of Aeoladas was one of the two Boeotarchs from Thebes (the other was Arianthidas the son of Lysimachidas), and he held the presidency: he wanted to do battle, and thought the risk worth taking. He summoned the troops in successive companies, so that not all should leave their posts at the same time, and tried to persuade the Boeotians to go against the Athenians and take up the challenge. He spoke to them as follows:
...
With this exhortation Pagondas persuaded the Boeotians to confront the Athenians. He quickly mobilized his forces (it was already late in the day) and led them on close to the Athenian army, settling in a position where direct sight of each other was prevented by an intervening hill: here he formed up and prepared for battle. Hippocrates was still at Delium, and when he received a report of the Boeotian advance he sent instructions to his army to take up position. He himself came on shortly afterwards, leaving at Delium about three hundred cavalry to guard the place against any attack and also to watch for an opportunity to charge the Boeotians in the course of the battle. The Boeotians posted a detachment to oppose them: then, when all arrangements were in order, they appeared over the crest of the hill in the formation they had planned. They numbered about seven thousand hoplites, over ten thousand light-armed troops, a thousand cavalry, and five hundred peltasts. The right wing was held by the Thebans and their confederates; in the centre were the men from Haliartus, Coroneia, Copae and the other places round lake Copaïs; the men from Thespiae, Tanagra, and Orchomenus held the left wing; the cavalry and light-armed troops were placed on each wing. The Thebans were formed up to a depth of twenty-five ranks, and the others in whatever formation suited each contingent. This, then, was the scale and disposition of the Boeotian army.
Помянутые "light-armed troops" - опять псилы (ψιλοὶ).
The Athenian hoplites, equal in number to their opponents, were drawn up eight-deep across the whole of their line, with cavalry stationed on either wing. There were no professionally equipped light troops present on this occasion, nor did Athens ever have a regular force of this kind. The full tally of those involved in the invasion was several times greater than that of their opponents, but most of them had come unarmed, given the universal call-up of all foreigners then in Athens as well as the citizens: these had already started for home, and only a few were there to take part in the battle. Formation made and engagement imminent, Hippocrates the general went along the Athenian line with these words of encouragement:
Речь снова идет о псилах (ψιλοὶ). Их изначально было, по Фукидиду, именно во много раз больше (πολλαπλάσιοι τῶν), чем беотийских. То есть - порядка 30 тысяч или даже больше. Многие (πολλοὶ) были вовсе безоружны (ἄοπλοί). Мобилизация была именно что полной (πανστρατιᾶς ... γενομένης), равно граждан (ἀστῶν) и иноземцев (ξένων).
Как там:
Киӕне же рекоша Вѧчьславу и Изѧславу . и Ростиславу . ать же поидуть вси . како можеть и хлоудъ в роуци взѧти пакъı . ли хто не поидет̑ намъ же и даи ать мъı сами побьемъı . и тако поидоша . другъ друга не ѡста но вси с радостью по своих̑ кн҃зехъ и на коних̑ и пѣши многое множество шедше и сташа оу Звенигорода
С другой стороны - в Barry S. Strauss. Athens after the Peloponnesian War. Class, Faction and Policy 403-386 B.C. 1986 численность граждан-фетов 18-59 лет оценивается на 431 год в более чем 20 тысяч. Да, были еще иноземцы и метеки. Но афинских гоплитов, численность которых Фукидид указал прямо, хорошо если половина от общего ресурса набирается. ИМХО, не исключено, что "во много раз больше" на практике выглядело просто как "много больше".
Большая часть афинских псилов, конечно, в битве не приняла участия. Но они, все-таки, скорее "поспешили с возвращением домой", а не "перед битвой разбежались".
В Anthony M. Snodgrass. Arms and Armor of the Greeks. 1967
Light-armed forces existed, but there was not the time, nor even perhaps the desire to train the landless and the poor to the high degree of efficiency required for really effective skirmishers. Even their equipment was not standardized, as is shown by Thucydides' description of the Athenians at the battle of Delium as late as 424 (IV, 94)
Хотя тут Фукидид несколько нагнетает. В II.13.8 - за 7 лет до битвы.
Such was the encouragement he gave them in matters of finance. As for military resources, he said they had thirteen thousand hoplites, apart from the sixteen thousand in the garrison-posts and deployed along the fortifications. (This was the number on guard duty in the first years of the war, whenever the enemy invaded: they were drawn from the oldest and the youngest age groups, and from the metics who could serve as hoplites. The length of the wall from Phalerum to the circuit-wall of the city was four miles; the garrisoned part of this circuit-wall was a little under five miles long, and there was also an unguarded section between the Long Wall and the Phaleric Wall; the Long Walls to the Peiraeus were four and a half miles in length, and the outer wall was guarded; the total extent of the wall surrounding Peiraeus and Mounychia was six and a half miles, the garrisoned section comprising half of this length.) He also reported that they had twelve hundred cavalry, including mounted archers; sixteen hundred foot-archers; and three hundred seaworthy triremes. These were the resources - those numbers or more in each category - available to the Athenians when they entered the war and the first Peloponnesian invasion was imminent. To this account Pericles added more of his usual arguments to convince them that they would win through in the war.
В оригинале просто токсоты-лучники (τοξότας), но ранее там уже есть конные стрелки-гиппотокстоты (ἱπποτοξόταις).
Дополнительно - War, Democracy and Culture in Classical Athens. 2010
Далее - опять битва при Делии.
Hippocrates reached halfway along the line with this encouragement, but had no time to go further, as the Boeotians, likewise encouraged by Pagondas with a quick speech there and then, immediately shouted a paean and advanced on them down the hill. The Athenians advanced in turn and met them at a run. The extreme wings of the two armies never engaged, as both were stopped short by gullies in their way. But the rest clashed in a gruelling fight with shields shoving against shields. The Boeotians on the left wing and as far as the centre were losing to the Athenians, who pressed hard on that section and especially on the Thespians. The troops on either side of them had fallen back, so the Thespians were encircled and hemmed in: those who died were cut down defending themselves hand-to-hand. In the confusion of this encirclement some of the Athenians too were killed in mistake by their own side. So this section of the Boeotian line faced defeat, and ran to join that part of their army which was still fighting. Their right wing, where the Thebans were stationed, was getting the better of the Athenians, pushing them back gradually at first then ever more insistently. A further circumstance was that, in response to the difficulties of his left wing, Pagondas launched two squadrons of cavalry round the hill from the blind side, and their sudden appearance over the ridge struck terror into the victorious Athenian wing, who thought that another army was coming to attack them. Pressed now on both sides by the combination of this development and the Theban drive which was breaking their ranks, the entire Athenian army turned to flight.
Some made for Delium and the sea, and some for Oropus: others fled towards Mount Parnes, or in whatever direction they thought could offer some hope of safety. The Boeotians pursued to kill, especially their cavalry and the Locrians who had come in support just as the rout was beginning: but night closed the action, and helped the majority of the fleeing troops to make their escape. On the next day those who had reached Oropus and Delium were transported home by sea, leaving a garrison behind (they were still in possession of Delium). The Boeotians set up a trophy, recovered their own dead and stripped the enemy dead, posted a guard on the field, and returned to Tanagra, where they laid plans for an attack on Delium.
...
Delium was captured on the seventeenth day after the battle. Shortly afterwards the Athenian herald, knowing nothing of this event, came once more to ask for the dead: this time the Boeotians agreed their release and did not repeat the previous answer. In the battle there had died a little under five hundred Boeotians, and a little under a thousand Athenians, including their general Hippocrates, with heavy losses too among their light-armed troops and baggage-carriers.
ψιλῶν δὲ καὶ σκευοφόρων πολὺς ἀριθμός - псилов, однако, и обозников/носильщиков большое количество.
В Thucydides. The war of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians // edited and translated by Jeremy Mynott. Cambridge University Press. 2013:
The numbers of those killed in battle were just under 500 men on the Boeotian side, and just under 1,000 men on the Athenian side, including Hippocrates their general, besides a large number of light-armed troops and baggage-carriers.
Опять - беотийцы на одном крыле бегут и даже попадают в окружение, на другом - сами ломят. Афинские гоплиты сражаются между собой. Паника при виде внезапно появившегося отряда - "новое войско". Что характерно - "новые войска" и правда на поле боя появятся, те же локры.
Дополнительно:
- Victor Davis Hanson. The Other Greeks: The Family Farm and the Agrarian Roots of Western Civilization. 1999
- Henry Fynes Clinton. Fasti Hellenici: The Civil and Literary Chronology of Greece, from the Earliest Accounts to the Death of Augustus. II. 1834
- Robert J. Buck. A History of Boeotia. 1979
- Суриков И.Е. Античная Греция: политогенез, политические и правовые институты (Opuscula selecta II). 2018
Население Беотии, с изрядной долей гадания, полагают примерно в 150 тысяч человек, включая рабов. Взрослых мужчин - тысяч где-то 35 или около того, вместе с рабами. Без них - возможно, что порядка 30 тысяч, неравномерно делившихся между 20 с лишним полисами. С другой стороны:
The property requirement for those to serve as hoplites nearby at the Boeotian town of Orchomenos was apparently quite low, about forty-five measures (medimnoi) of yearly agricultural produce. ... Curiously, the forty-five medimnoi of annual agricultural produce is about a fourth of the old Solonian agrarian zeugitai qualification at Athens (two to three hundred medimnoi), a much steeper census which traditionally marked the cut-off point for enjoyment of full political rights, even under the democracy.
Хотя и тут не без особенностей. В тех же Афинах не было такой уж жесткой связки между имущественным классом и тем или иным типом службы.
- Hans van Wees. The Myth of the Middle-Class Army: Military and Social Status in Ancient Greece // In War as a Cultural and Social Force: Essays on Warfare in Antiquity. 2001
- David M. Pritchard. Armed Forces // The Cambridge companion to ancient Athens. 2021
Cezary Kucewicz, Matthew Lloyd, and Roel Konijnendijk. ‘Not Many Bows’? Light-Armed Fighters of the Tenth through Fourth Centuries // Brill’s companion to Greek land warfare beyond the phalanx. 2021
From the beginning of this period, we can identify two distinct types of light-armed forces. The first is the light-armed element of mass levies, so armed either because its members could not afford heavier equipment or because service as missile troops was typical in their region of origin. The second is smaller units of light infantry specialists, often maintained as standing troops or hired as foreign mercenaries. The role and perception of these types are quite different, so it will be worthwhile to treat them separately here. Mass levies of light-armed warriors are visible from the time of the Persian Wars. The light troops reported by Herodotos at Plataia are sometimes dismissed as mere servants and camp-followers, but the historian emphasises that the 35,000 helots brought as part of the Spartan levy were all armed for war (9.29.1). We have no reason to believe the other men he identified as light troops were not there to fight. Even if their equipment and skill will have varied greatly, the sheer numbers of the sub-hoplite levy made it a significant presence in Greek conflicts. Where the sources give us an estimate, the light-armed levy outnumbers the hoplites (Thuc. 4.93.3). Elsewhere they appear as a vast, numberless mass (Thuc. 2.31.2, 4.94.1). The demographics of Greek states imply that the light-armed element would have formed the lion’s share of any general levy - in other words, that the average Greek warrior of the fifth century fought with missiles, not shield and spear.
И Нефедкин А.К. Основные этапы формирования фаланги гоплитов: военный аспект проблемы // Вестник древней истории, №1, 2002.
Очевидно, некоторую промежуточную стадию в военном развитии древних греков нам представляет Беотия. Здесь в классическую эпоху мы находим тяжеловооруженную пехоту, построенную в глубокий строй, который Эпаминонд довел до 50 шеренг (Xen. Hel. VI.4.12). Конница же беотийцев также была одной из лучших в Греции (ср.: Hdt. IX.68). Однако обычно глубокое построение пехоты объясняется или плохим ее качеством (ср.: Thuc. VI.67.2), или удобством такого строя для марша на пересеченной местности (Агапеев А. Опыт истории развития стратегии и тактики наемных и постоянных армий новых государств. Вып. 1. СПб. 1902. С. 234, 242). Поскольку уже у древних Беотия считалась “площадкой для войны”, то второе предположение отпадает (ср.: Hdt. IX.2). Следовательно, можно остановится на первом предположении. Вероятно, лучше натренированная беотийская знать служила в коннице, тогда как пехота состояла из многочисленных, но недостаточно обученных ополченцев-крестьян. Поэтому главную роль в пешем войске фиванцев играл “Священный отряд” из 300 отборных воинов. Именно этих бойцов при Делии (424 г. до н. э.) ставят на фронте беотийцев, чтобы они служили ударной силой, для построенной позади них пехоты: “У беотийцев на правом крыле были построены фиванцы, а на левом - орхоменцы; беотийцы же заполнили центр фаланги; а впереди всех сражались триста отобранных мужей, называемых у них возницами и парабатами” (Diod. XII.70.1; cp.: Asclep. Tact. 3.5; Ael. Tact.13.1-2; Arr. Tact. 12.1-2). Таким образом, в Беотии мы находим и хорошую конницу, и достаточно боеспособную пехоту.
P.S. Thucydides. The Peloponnesian War / translated by Martin Hammond, with an introduction and notes by P.J. Rhodes. Oxford University Press. 2009
No scribe at any date is likely to have copied a substantial portion of the text in front of him without making errors of his own, and perhaps also emending (whether correctly or incorrectly) what he took to be errors in the text in front of him, so no manuscript copy of Thucydides’ text is likely to be identical either with any other copy or with the text which Thucydides himself wrote. It is not always easy for modern scholars to identify and correct their predecessors’ errors, and neither we in deciding what text to translate nor any other modern editors are likely to have succeeded at every point in recovering what Thucydides himself wrote (though every editor aims to do that).
Thucydides’ text is known to have existed in the ancient world in a number of different versions: our medieval manuscripts transmit a version which divides the text into eight books, but there is no indication of a division made by Thucydides himself, and we know that other versions existed which divided the text into a larger number of books. Modern texts are based primarily on eight medieval manuscripts, written between the tenth and the fourteenth centuries (each of the other surviving manuscripts is a descendant of one or another of those). In addition we have a number of papyrus fragments, written between the third century BC and the sixth century AD, which contain parts of the text. We also have indirect evidence for the text of Thucydides. There are places where ancient authors and commentators (themselves transmitted to us by generations of copyists) quote or expound Thucydides, and sometimes their text is different from that of our surviving copies. Lorenzo Valla, who completed a Latin translation of Thucydides in 1452, had access to manuscripts independent of those which now survive; and some independent manuscripts also lie behind the sixteenth-century printed editions of Henri Estienne (Stephanus) and Aemilius Portus.
We have taken as our starting-point the Oxford Classical Text of H. Stuart Jones, equipped with an improved apparatus criticus in 1942 by J.E. Powell (and with an improved index in 1963 by an unidentified scholar); and below we supply textual notes for all points where the text which we translate is different from the OCT, and for some points where we follow the OCT but some current scholars do not. Not all of these divergences have a significant effect on the sense or the detail, but where they do the textual issues are discussed in the Explanatory Notes.