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[sulphuroxide]

Hegel is wrong. the absolute truth cannot be an essential unity so essential that it is devoid of specific phenomena. such a relationship would toss out THE REST OF THE WORLD it's not seperate or embedded or a comment; it's overlaid immanent.

the absolute truth is not missing the rest of everything else.

Comments

[niveau]

But wouldn't such an immanence be housed in a general, benign difference? Or, at least, trapped in the prison house of immanentism?

I read Hegel's path to the Absolute in the Phenomenology as a very difficult thing fraught with failed fusions, misfiring syntheses, and problematic particulars; always beginning from "not Nothing", a point of radical negativity. Simply put, absolute truth is the truth of everything in so far as it cannot inhere in any particular object's "particularity". Husserl rearticulates this as the epoché ("it must always remain open" chant the true Husserlians).

Admittedly, the Boston Hegelians tend to see Hegel's position as better articulated in his Logic than the Phenomenology. But I think there's more to work with in the Phenomenology in so far as a consciousness can recognise another consciousness and create a synthetic Third that is neither consciousness in particular but their relation to one another in itself.

[sulphuroxide]

i agree with your reading of phenomenology of spirit... it does fail at various points... though i must say that i dont know who these boston hegelians are. i just find that an absolute truth that can't be begotten and 'throws away everything it started with' fails at its objective. it may still be 'truth' but meaningfulness like a good story arc needs to return to us the world we left... adding to it as well and changing everything even if nothing has moved