don't have an LJ, so here
anonymous
September 26 2006, 01:31:37 UTC
It is not that they do not belong to the other things in a way that resembles this, but only that they do not belong to them primarily. For it is not necessary, if we assume this, that there be a definition of whatever means the same thing as a group of words, but only that there be one of what means the same thing as a certain kind of group of words, and this is one that belongs to tomething that is one, not by being continuous in the way that the ILIAD is, nor by being bundled together, but in just those ways that one is meant. Now one is meant in the same ways as being, and being signifies in one way a THIS, in another a so-much, and in another an of-this-sort. And for this reason there will be a statement and a definition of a pale person, but in a different way than of pale, or of an independent being. Aristotle, METAPHYSICS, end of Book 5 -- right at hand, teaching parts of it in PHIL 102 (not this part). You'll know who.
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Aristotle, METAPHYSICS, end of Book 5 -- right at hand, teaching parts of it in PHIL 102 (not this part). You'll know who.
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