Shiny Happy Russian Babies
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CULTURAL AFFILIATION FOUND TO IMPACT ON RUSSIAN DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS
By Paul Goble
Diverse degrees of continuing attachment to traditional
culture go further towards explaining the variance in demographic
behavior among ethnic groups in the Russian Federation than do
variations in material well-being, according to an analysis of data
collected since the last Soviet census in 1989. Consequently,
policies predicated on the assumption that money alone can change
such behavior are doomed to failure and may even prove
counterproductive, unless officials recognize this fact and combine
them with other measures as well.
In an article for the Russian Civilization Foundation,
sociologist Vardan Bagdasaryan describes what he calls "the
ethno-confessional limits of the demographic crisis in Russia" and
discusses the difficulties involved in changing the current
situation.
Comparing the findings of the 1989 Soviet and 2002 Russian
censuses, Bagdasaryan notes that the total population of Russia in
2002 was 98.7 percent of that in 1989, while the percentage of ethnic
Russians among Russia's population fell by a further 2 percentage
points over that period, to 96.7 percent in 2002.
Looking at the issue more broadly, he reports, not only the
Russians but all other peoples of Russia, except for the Ossetians
"who belong to the Orthodox cultural world," declined during this
period, while all the Muslim and Buddhist peoples of Russia "without
exception" saw their numbers increase.
Bagdasaryan notes that only 18 subjects of the Russian
Federation currently have a positive balance of births over deaths,
and 17 of these are non-Russian national-territorial formations. The
only exception to this pattern is the predominantly ethnic Russian
region of Tyumen. Indeed, he continues, the demographic crisis of
excess deaths over births that has been characteristic of the Russian
and more generally Orthodox part of the population has "simply passed
[the Muslims and Buddhists] by."
Many analysts attempt to explain this development by pointing
to the location of these groups -- more Muslims live in the southern
portions of the country -- or to their level of urbanization --
Russians are more urbanized than most other national groups in that
country. But such explanations are not supported by the facts,
Bagdasaryan says. On the one hand, birthrates among ethnic Russian
women living in national republics turn out in every case to be lower
than the representatives of Muslim or Buddhist groups among whom they
live.
And on the other, pagan groups in the Far East, Siberia and
the North grew rapidly during this intercensal period -- with the
Manis increasing by 44.6 percent and the Khantys by 30 percent, for
example -- despite the extreme climatic conditions in the regions
where they live.
This pattern suggests, Bagdasaryan says, that those peoples
who traditionally embraced Orthodox Christianity were affected to a
far greater degree by Soviet atheistic propaganda, a trend that left
them without the kind of cultural defense that other religious
traditions -- including Islam, Buddhism and paganism -- provided
their followers. That finding in turn inevitably leads to the
conclusion, Bagdasaryan continues, that there is little possibility
of overcoming the current demographic decline by material stimuli
alone.
In support of that argument, he reports on a study of the
influence of various factors on demographic behavior such as
birthrates. With one being a maximum, the greatest influence on
demographic behavior, with a coefficient of 0.83, is the ideological
and spiritual condition of the various peoples. Other factors had a
smaller influence, he reports: the national orientation of the
Russian state -- 0.75, state administrative policies -- 0.59, and
material conditions of life -- 0.49, or only a little more than half
the impact on demographic behavior that cultural factors do.
Given that pattern, Bagdasaryan continues, the use of
monetary mechanisms to stimulate the birthrate may well produce
exactly the reverse result. Such investments will have little impact
on the Russians and other Orthodox communities, but will result in
even higher birthrates among Muslims.
They will have one positive consequence, however, Bagdasaryan
acknowledges: they will improve the quality of life of the existing
population and thus may contribute to the reversal of falling life
expectancies among Russians -- but that is not how the case for such
investments is typically made.
In support of his belief that attachment to traditional
culture helps to promote more favorable demographic outcomes,
Bagdasaryan puts forward two sets of data: one concerning demographic
data in Russia over the last 150 years and the other on demographic
behavior in European countries.
At the end of the 19th century, he notes, when the Russian
Empire was an Orthodox state committed to Orthodox values, birthrates
among ethnic Russians were almost 1.5 times higher than those among
Muslims living within the boundaries of that empire. But Soviet
policies, including "the detraditionalization of the Russian people,"
reversed that trend, with the result that by the time the USSR
collapsed, the desire to have a successor generation was lower among
Russian women than among those of any titular nationality of the
union republics. Moreover, that negative trend was exacerbated by the
"antinational" policies of the Russian government in the first decade
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, policies that undermined the
confidence of Russians and other traditionally Orthodox ethnic groups
in the future and thus deterred many couples from having children.
Bagdasaryan's other set of data focus on demographic behavior
in Europe. He reports that 2002 data from 33 European countries
supports his contention that traditional culture is the most
important factor in explaining birthrates and other forms of
demographic behavior. At first glance, he acknowledges, the
differences among these countries in terms of birthrates may seem
relatively small. But if one divides the European countries into two
categories -- the eight that have monarchies and the 25 that are
republics -- one can easily see the continuing impact of traditional
values.
Of the eight monarchies, Bagdasaryan reports, all have
birthrates above 10 per 1,000 annually, whereas among the 25
republics, only seven of them exceed that figure.
"Of course," he acknowledges, "in contemporary constitutional
monarchies, the crowned heads have only nominal and largely
decorative power. However, the very fact of the preservation of
traditional political institutions provides evidence of the presence
of a certain traditional potential." Bagdasaryan stops short,
however, of arguing that Russia could resolve its current demographic
problems by restoring the monarchy.
Another article published earlier this month provides
additional context. "Vechernyaya Moskva" noted on August 8 that
Russia's demographic situation is becoming so alarming that the
question may soon be not "how to live?" but rather "who will [still]
be alive?" Comparing fertility rates in various countries, the paper
noted that in Tajikistan, women on average have 3.68 children. In the
United States, this figure is 2.06, and in China 1.68. But in Russia
as a whole, the average woman has 1.34 children, and the average
Muscovite woman has 1.14. Maintaining population levels requires
about 2.2 children.
The Moscow paper further pointed to a still more worrisome
fact: Russia's current very low birthrates are likely to have an even
more negative impact in the future, even if they rise slightly in the
short term. That is become the number of young women who could become
mothers is much smaller than in the preceding generation.
The paper's only positive finding concerned the dwindling
number of abortions in the Russian Federation: while in 1990, there
were 206 abortions for each 100 live births, now, there are 122
abortions for every 100 new babies.
(Paul Goble is the former publisher of "RFE/RL Newsline" and a
longtime Soviet nationalities expert with the U.S. government.)
CULTURAL AFFILIATION FOUND TO IMPACT ON RUSSIAN DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS
By Paul Goble
Diverse degrees of continuing attachment to traditional
culture go further towards explaining the variance in demographic
behavior among ethnic groups in the Russian Federation than do
variations in material well-being, according to an analysis of data
collected since the last Soviet census in 1989. Consequently,
policies predicated on the assumption that money alone can change
such behavior are doomed to failure and may even prove
counterproductive, unless officials recognize this fact and combine
them with other measures as well.
In an article for the Russian Civilization Foundation,
sociologist Vardan Bagdasaryan describes what he calls "the
ethno-confessional limits of the demographic crisis in Russia" and
discusses the difficulties involved in changing the current
situation.
Comparing the findings of the 1989 Soviet and 2002 Russian
censuses, Bagdasaryan notes that the total population of Russia in
2002 was 98.7 percent of that in 1989, while the percentage of ethnic
Russians among Russia's population fell by a further 2 percentage
points over that period, to 96.7 percent in 2002.
Looking at the issue more broadly, he reports, not only the
Russians but all other peoples of Russia, except for the Ossetians
"who belong to the Orthodox cultural world," declined during this
period, while all the Muslim and Buddhist peoples of Russia "without
exception" saw their numbers increase.
Bagdasaryan notes that only 18 subjects of the Russian
Federation currently have a positive balance of births over deaths,
and 17 of these are non-Russian national-territorial formations. The
only exception to this pattern is the predominantly ethnic Russian
region of Tyumen. Indeed, he continues, the demographic crisis of
excess deaths over births that has been characteristic of the Russian
and more generally Orthodox part of the population has "simply passed
[the Muslims and Buddhists] by."
Many analysts attempt to explain this development by pointing
to the location of these groups -- more Muslims live in the southern
portions of the country -- or to their level of urbanization --
Russians are more urbanized than most other national groups in that
country. But such explanations are not supported by the facts,
Bagdasaryan says. On the one hand, birthrates among ethnic Russian
women living in national republics turn out in every case to be lower
than the representatives of Muslim or Buddhist groups among whom they
live.
And on the other, pagan groups in the Far East, Siberia and
the North grew rapidly during this intercensal period -- with the
Manis increasing by 44.6 percent and the Khantys by 30 percent, for
example -- despite the extreme climatic conditions in the regions
where they live.
This pattern suggests, Bagdasaryan says, that those peoples
who traditionally embraced Orthodox Christianity were affected to a
far greater degree by Soviet atheistic propaganda, a trend that left
them without the kind of cultural defense that other religious
traditions -- including Islam, Buddhism and paganism -- provided
their followers. That finding in turn inevitably leads to the
conclusion, Bagdasaryan continues, that there is little possibility
of overcoming the current demographic decline by material stimuli
alone.
In support of that argument, he reports on a study of the
influence of various factors on demographic behavior such as
birthrates. With one being a maximum, the greatest influence on
demographic behavior, with a coefficient of 0.83, is the ideological
and spiritual condition of the various peoples. Other factors had a
smaller influence, he reports: the national orientation of the
Russian state -- 0.75, state administrative policies -- 0.59, and
material conditions of life -- 0.49, or only a little more than half
the impact on demographic behavior that cultural factors do.
Given that pattern, Bagdasaryan continues, the use of
monetary mechanisms to stimulate the birthrate may well produce
exactly the reverse result. Such investments will have little impact
on the Russians and other Orthodox communities, but will result in
even higher birthrates among Muslims.
They will have one positive consequence, however, Bagdasaryan
acknowledges: they will improve the quality of life of the existing
population and thus may contribute to the reversal of falling life
expectancies among Russians -- but that is not how the case for such
investments is typically made.
In support of his belief that attachment to traditional
culture helps to promote more favorable demographic outcomes,
Bagdasaryan puts forward two sets of data: one concerning demographic
data in Russia over the last 150 years and the other on demographic
behavior in European countries.
At the end of the 19th century, he notes, when the Russian
Empire was an Orthodox state committed to Orthodox values, birthrates
among ethnic Russians were almost 1.5 times higher than those among
Muslims living within the boundaries of that empire. But Soviet
policies, including "the detraditionalization of the Russian people,"
reversed that trend, with the result that by the time the USSR
collapsed, the desire to have a successor generation was lower among
Russian women than among those of any titular nationality of the
union republics. Moreover, that negative trend was exacerbated by the
"antinational" policies of the Russian government in the first decade
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, policies that undermined the
confidence of Russians and other traditionally Orthodox ethnic groups
in the future and thus deterred many couples from having children.
Bagdasaryan's other set of data focus on demographic behavior
in Europe. He reports that 2002 data from 33 European countries
supports his contention that traditional culture is the most
important factor in explaining birthrates and other forms of
demographic behavior. At first glance, he acknowledges, the
differences among these countries in terms of birthrates may seem
relatively small. But if one divides the European countries into two
categories -- the eight that have monarchies and the 25 that are
republics -- one can easily see the continuing impact of traditional
values.
Of the eight monarchies, Bagdasaryan reports, all have
birthrates above 10 per 1,000 annually, whereas among the 25
republics, only seven of them exceed that figure.
"Of course," he acknowledges, "in contemporary constitutional
monarchies, the crowned heads have only nominal and largely
decorative power. However, the very fact of the preservation of
traditional political institutions provides evidence of the presence
of a certain traditional potential." Bagdasaryan stops short,
however, of arguing that Russia could resolve its current demographic
problems by restoring the monarchy.
Another article published earlier this month provides
additional context. "Vechernyaya Moskva" noted on August 8 that
Russia's demographic situation is becoming so alarming that the
question may soon be not "how to live?" but rather "who will [still]
be alive?" Comparing fertility rates in various countries, the paper
noted that in Tajikistan, women on average have 3.68 children. In the
United States, this figure is 2.06, and in China 1.68. But in Russia
as a whole, the average woman has 1.34 children, and the average
Muscovite woman has 1.14. Maintaining population levels requires
about 2.2 children.
The Moscow paper further pointed to a still more worrisome
fact: Russia's current very low birthrates are likely to have an even
more negative impact in the future, even if they rise slightly in the
short term. That is become the number of young women who could become
mothers is much smaller than in the preceding generation.
The paper's only positive finding concerned the dwindling
number of abortions in the Russian Federation: while in 1990, there
were 206 abortions for each 100 live births, now, there are 122
abortions for every 100 new babies.
(Paul Goble is the former publisher of "RFE/RL Newsline" and a
longtime Soviet nationalities expert with the U.S. government.)