Операция INFEKTION: «СПИД. Сделано в США» (Список литературы).
Сводный пост: Операция INFEKTION: "СПИД. Сделано в США"
Глава №1: Операция INFEKTION: «СПИД. Сделано в США» (часть 1)
Глава №2: Операция INFEKTION: «СПИД. Сделано в США» (часть 2)
Глава №3: Операция INFEKTION: «СПИД. Сделано в США» (часть 3)
Список литературы: Операция INFEKTION: «СПИД. Сделано в США» (Список литературы)
Список использованной литературы:
1. In a lecture to Department X recruits in 1986, cited in: Günter Bohnsack and Herbert Brehmer, Auftrag: Irreführung: Wie die Stasi Politik im Westen machte (Hamburg: Carlsen, 1992), 19.
2. Michael Herman, Intelligence and Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 55f.
3. House Committee on Intelligence, Soviet Active Measures, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982), 31.
4. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, Instructions from the Center: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations 1975-1985 (London: Hodder& Stoughton, 1991), 3.
5. For the Panorama broadcast of 28 January 1991, see Rote Fahne, 30 December 2004, and Bohnsack letter to author, 22 September 2008; Bohnsack and Brehmer, Auftrag: Irreführung.
6. Statement by CIA Deputy Director of Operations John McMahon, House Committee on Intelligence, Soviet Covert Action: The Forgery Offensive, (Washington,DC: Government Printing Office, 1982), 6.
7. According to Michael Herman, in 1987, only 3 percent of the CIA’s staff was involved in covert action, and only 5 percent of the agency’s budget went into it. (Hermann, Intelligence Power, 56.)
8. For information on the KGB’s planting of the Kennedy conspiracy theory, see Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev,Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964: The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W.W.Norton, 1998), 343-50; for East German Nazi disinformation campaigns against West Germany, see Hubertus Knabe, Die unterwanderte Republik. Stasiim Westen (Berlin: Propyläen, 1999), 121-52.
9. Ladislav Bittman, The KGB and Soviet Disinformation:An Insider’s View (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1985), 49. In the same vein, see Ilya Dzhirkvelov, Secret Servant: My Life with the KGB and the Soviet Elite (New York: Harper & Row,1987), 304f.
10. Operation RYAN (the KGB codename) had KGB officers in Western capitals carry out a regular census of the number of cars and lighted windows at all hours at government buildings and military installations
possibly involved in preparations for nuclear war and to report immediately any deviations from the norm. See Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 589.
11. House Intelligence Committee, Soviet Covert Action, 30.
12. Bittman, Deception Game: Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Research Corp., 1972), 125.
13. Bittman, Deception Game, 125.
14. The West German security service publication Innere Sicherheit, 1 (20 March 1985), 2, noted that such letters were typically provided not as originals but as photographs of alleged originals, so as to make it more difficult to detect the forgery.
15. Bittman, KGB and Soviet Disinformation, 44.
16. Innere Sicherheit 1, (3 March 1985), 2; US Department of State, Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda 1986-87 (Washington, DC: Department of State Publications,
1987), ix, 4; US Department of State, Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1987-1988 (Washington, DC: Department of State Publications, 1989), 23.
17. US Department of State, Soviet Influence Activities 1986-87, 34f. The “confessions” had no basis in fact.
18. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 503f. Again, the Soviet claim was spurious.
19. Washington Post, 22 April 1980.
20. Lee Richards, “Whispers of War: The British World War II Rumor Campaign,” The Intelligencer 16, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 54.
21. Jonathan B. Tucker, “The ‘Yellow Rain’ Controversy: Lessons for Arms Control Compliance,” The Nonproliferation Review 8 (Spring 2001): 31.
22. Bohnsack and Brehmer, Auftrag: Irreführung, 219.
23. Bohnsack letter to author, 6 March 2009.
24. Primakov, then SVR (Russian foreign intelligence) director, made his remarks to graduate students in Moscow during an SVR recruitment drive in 1992; Boston Globe, 19 March 1992; Izvestiya, 19 March 1992.
25. Patriot, 17 July 1983.
26. “Interagency Intelligence Study,” cited in House Intelligence Committee, Soviet Active Measures, 55. The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) 21 These charges were intended to undermine the regime of the Pakistani president, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, a pivotal ally in Washington’s efforts to assist anti-Soviet Afghan mujahideen.
27. Interviews with KGB Major-General (ret.) Oleg Kalugin, 1 October and 22 December 2008.
28. Army Research, Development & Acquisition 23, no. 4 (July-August 1982): 48f.
29. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 628.
30. Bittman, Deception Game, 227; Todd Leventhal, “The origins of AIDS disinformation,” January 9,2009, available online at http://blogs.america.gov/rumors/2009/01/09/the-origins-of-aids-disinformation/ .Additional comments on the KGB’s use of non-native speakers as translators were provided to the author by Todd Leventhal, 25 February 2009.
31. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 324; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 507.
32. The Patriot was established under the auspices of the KGB resident in New Delhi, Radomir Aleksandrovich Bogdanov, with the assistance of KGB officer Ilya Dzhirkvelov, see Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB, 503, and Dzhirkvelov, Secret Servant, 303f. For a US assessment of the Patriot, see State Department, Soviet Influence Activities 1986-87, 44.
33. David A. Spetrino, “Aids Disinformation,” Studies in Intelligence 32, no. 4 (1988): 10.
34. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 608, 628.
35. Department of State, Soviet Influence Activities 1986-87, 34f.
36. Literaturnaya Gazeta, 30 October 1985. I am grateful to Kristina N. Terzieva for an English translation of this and a later article.
37. Department of State, Soviet Influence Activities 1986-87, 40.
38. Oleg Kalugin, The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 158. See a statement to the same effect by Martin C. Portman of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations in House Intelligence Committee, Soviet Active Measures, 21.
39. Literaturnaya Gazeta, 30 October 1985. Zapevalov’s name was not a pseudonym. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, he became a successful businessman, author, and spokesman for Russia’sarms-export agency Rosvooruzhenie.
40. The station chief, Larry Devlin, decided not to carry out the assignment. Lumumba was later killed by local rivals. See Larry Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo: A Memoir of 1960-67 (New York: Public
Affairs, 2007), 94-97, 113-14.
41. Bohnsack and Brehmer, Auftrag: Irreführung, 219.
42. Bohnsack letter to author, 14 August 2008.
43. Bohnsack and Brehmer, Auftrag: Irreführung, 219f; Bohnsack letters to author, 25 July and 14 August 2008.
44. Bittman, Deception Game, 141; Bohnsack and Brehmer, Auftrag: Irreführung, 40f, 218; Oleg Gordievsky e-mail to author, 20 September 2008; Oleg Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution: The Autobiography
of Oleg Gordievsky (London: Macmillan, 1995), 183.
45. Innere Sicherheit, 1 (March 20, 1985), 3; Bohnsack letter to author, 14 August 2008.
46. Segal provided his biographical data to edition monochrom in 1993, http://www.monochrom.at/segal . See also John O. Koehler, Stasi: The Untold Story of the East German Secret Police (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 2000), 260f.
47. Aktennotiz (note for the record) by Kurt Seidel on conversation with Jakob Segal, 17 September 1986, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/vorl.SED 36832 [henceforth SAPMO].
48. Bohnsack letter to author, 25 July 2008. Bohnsack describes Segal as “partly a convinced scientist, partly an operative assistant [operativer Helfer], probably a colorful mix.”
49. According to Todd Leventhal, who visited Fort Detrick and saw building 550, it was an ordinary looking bungalow with a front porch; interview with Todd Leventhal and Oleg Kalugin, 22 December 2008. Segal may have thought of building 470, locally referred to as “anthrax tower,” a pilot plant for testing optimal fermentor and bacterial purification technologies. It was torn down in 2003. Also, he evidently meant “BSL-4” or “Level-4” rather than “P-4” laboratories. BSL-4 or Level-4 laboratories handle The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth 22 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) deadly diseases that have no cure; see House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Germs, Viruses and Secrets: The Silent Proliferation of Bio-Laboratories in the United States (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 1, 54.
50. Jakob Segal and Lilli Segal, AIDS-Die Spur führt ins Pentagon, second edition (Essen: Verlag Neuer Weg, 1990), 138.
51. Behling e-mails to author, 30 and 31 March 2009.
52. Michael D. Morrissey letter to Noam Chomsky, 14 September 1989, http://educate-yourself.org/cn/morrisseycorrespondencewithnoamchomsky.shtml; Gazette, 16 February 1992. However,others considered Segal a “pompous ass” (penetranter Wichtigtuer), Behling e-mail to author, 18 November 2008.
53. Jakob Segal, Lilli Segal, and Ronald Dehmlow, AIDS-its nature and origin (no place, no date [1986]). I am grateful to US Department of State Anti-Misinformation Officer Todd Leventhal for a copy of the pamphlet.
54. Stefan Nickels, “Geheimprojekt ‘Naomi’: Um den Ursprung von Aids ranken sich seit langem obskure Hypothesen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 17 October 2004. As mentioned earlier, MKNAOMI was the CIA codename for an early Cold War bacteriological weapons research program at Fort Detrick.
55. Behling e-mail to author, 15 July 2008, based on an interview with Bohnsack. In his 1986 pamphlet, Segal quotes an East German publication for his allegations about Fort Detrick: Reinhard Pieckocki, Genmanipulation: Frevel oder Fortschritt (Leipzig, Jena, Berlin: Urania Verlag, 1983).
56. Department of State, Soviet Influence Activities 1986-87, 35; Bohnsack letters to author, 25 July and 14 August 2008. According to Bohnsack, the HVA deployed Capt. Hans Pfeiffer and “officer on special assignment” [Offizier im besonderen Einsatz or OibE] Horst Schoetzki, officially a journalist representing the GDR magazine Horizont, to the conference. See also Christhard Läpple, Verrat verjährt nicht: Lebensgeschichten aus einem einst geteilten Land (Hamburg: Hoffman & Campe, 2008), 299f.
57. Bohnsack letter to author, 25 July 2008; Spetrino, “Aids Disinformation,” 11.
58. Segal to Axen, 8 September 1986, memorandum regarding economic aspects of AIDS, SAPMO.
59. Segal to Axen, 27 August 1986, SAPMO.
60. Department of State, Soviet Influence Activities 1986-87, 37.
61. Kurt Seidel, note for the record, 17 September 1986, SAPMO.
62. Bohnsack letter to author, 26 November 2008. Bohnsack writes that MfS director Erich Mielke did not necessarily inform his Politburo colleagues about ongoing active measures but that Hager was probably
aware of the AIDS campaign.
63. Hager to Seidel, 26 September 1986, with copy to General Axen, SAPMO.
64. Bohnsack letter to author, 26 November 2008.
65. Der Spiegel, 10 November 1986.
66. Jakob Segal interview, Freitag, 17 May 1991.
67. Milt Bearden and James Risen, The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA’s Final Showdown with the KGB (New York: Random House, 2003), 385.
68. Bohnsack letter to author, 26 November 2008. Between 1970 and 1989, Bohnsack was HVA X liaison with the KGB and was thus informed about joint East German/Soviet disinformation campaigns. Bohnsack letter to author, 14 August 2008.
69. The interview was subsequently published in book form in Kuno Kruse (ed.), Aids-Erreger aus dem Genlabor? Die Diskussion der rätselhaften Krankheit, die die Welt bedroht (Berlin: Simon &
Leutner, 1987), 15-27.
70. John Borneman, “AIDS in the Two Berlins,” in Douglas Crimp (ed.), AIDS: Cultural Analysis/Cultural Activism (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988), 234.
71. Klaus Behling, Kundschafter a.D.: Das Ende der DDR-Spionage (Stuttgart, Leipzig: Hohenheim Verlag, 2003), 252f.
72. Johannes Mario Simmel, Doch mit den Clowns kamen die Tränen (Munich: Droemer Knaur, 1987), 9, 110f.
73. Wolf resigned his directorship in 1986 but, according to Bohnsack, retained his secret service ID card, personal driver, and assistant and remained as consultant and “guiding spirit” at HVA headquarters; Bohnsack letter, 25 July 2008.
74. Der Spiegel, 7 September 1987.
75. Department of State, Soviet Influence Activities 1986-1987, 29; Shankar Vedantam, “Persis The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) 23 tence of Myths Could Alter Public Policy Approach,” Washington Post, 4 September 2007.
76. Alvin A. Snyder, Warriors of Disinformation: American Propaganda, Soviet Lies, and the Winning of the Cold War. An Insider's Account (New York: Arcade, 1995), 113f; Ladislav Bittman, The New Image-Makers: Soviet Propaganda & Disinformation Today (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988), 25.
77. Spetrino, “Aids Disinformation,” 9, 11; Sunday Express, 26 October 1986; Daily Telegraph, 27 October 1986. On the other hand, the London Times, 31 October 1986, lambasted the Express for giving Segal a platform.
78. USIA official Herbert Romerstein, quoted in Toronto Star, 28 April 1987.
79. Times, 31 October 1986. See also Der Spiegel, 10 November 1986.
80. Department of State, Soviet Influence Activities 1986-87, 33.
81. United States Information Agency (USIA), Soviet Active Measures in the Era of Glasnost: A Report to Congress (March 1988), 12; Department of State, Soviet Influence Activities 1986-87, 35.
82. Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret History of Chemical and Biological Warfare (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 240.
83. Snyder, Warriors of Disinformation, 116.
84. Spetrino, “Aids Disinformation,” 11.
85. Department of State, Soviet Influence Activities 1986-87, 40; Spetrino, “Aids Disinformation,” 14.
86. USIA, Soviet Active Measures in the Era of Glasnost, 82, 86; Department of State, Soviet Influence Activities 1986-87, iii. The West Germans established a similar group, Innere Sicherheit [internal security], which included representatives from foreign intelligence (BND) and counterintelligence (BfV) agencies; Bohnsack letter, 25 July 2008.
87. Snyder, Warriors of Disinformation, 93, 113.
88. Koehler, Stasi, 260. Koehler was then working as a consultant to USIA director Charles Z. Wick.
89. Murray Feshbach, “The Early Days of HIV/AIDS Epidemic in the Former Soviet Union” (paper prepared for the conference “Health and Demography in the Former Soviet Union,” Harvard University, April 2005), 9, argues that the 1983 Patriot letter was a “ghost source” generated by Service A specialists to enable Soviet propagandist to quote a non-Soviet source. Even though the technique of using “ghost sources” was not unknown to Soviet bloc intelligence, it was not employed in this instance. The Indian National Library at Kolkata holds a copy of the Patriot, dated 17 July 1983, which carries the AIDS letter.
90. Literaturnaya Gazeta, 19 November 1986. (Translation by Kristina N. Terzieva.)
91. See, for instance, Christian Science Monitor, 11 December 1986, and New York Times, 8 April 1987.
92. Department of State, Soviet Influence Activities 1987-88, 33-36; Der Spiegel, 9 March 1987.
93. New York Times, 5 November 1987.
94. Snyder, Warriors of Disinformation, 182f.
95. USIA, Soviet Active Measures in the Era of Glasnost, 11.
96. Department of State, Soviet Influence Activities 1987-1988, 2f.
97. Department of State, Soviet Influence Activities 1987-1988, 4.
98. USIA, Soviet Active Measures in the “Post-Cold War” Era 1988-1991: A Report Prepared at the Request of the United States House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 1992), 71-75. Pagination according to online edition.
99. USIA, Soviet Active Measures in the Era of Glasnost, 12-49.
100. Behling, Kundschafter a.D., 253; House Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1970 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1969), 129. The text of Mac-Arthur’s testimony was made available to the public long before Segal “discovered” it. Paxman and Harris, A Higher Form of Killing, 241, also quote from it.
101. Obituary, Donald Malcolm MacArthur, Washington Post, 29 November 1988. After leaving government, MacArthur founded Dynamac, which The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth 24 Studies in intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) helped conduct anthrax sampling after the anonymous attacks in 2001 and performed cleanup at two anthrax-contaminated federal buildings in Washington, DC.
102. Segal mentioned the MacArthur testimony first in a reply to his critics in 1987, see Kruse, Aids, 51, 55. Disinformation on the NCI’s alleged role was provided by HVA X, see Behling, Kundschafter a.D., 253.
103. Raimund Geene, AIDS-Politik: Ein neues Krankheitsbild zwischen Medizin, Politik und Gesundheitsförderung (Frankfurt a.M.: Mabuse, 2000), 294.
104. Michael D. Morrissey letter to Noam Chomsky, 14 September 1989; Chomsky replied that the Mac-Arthur testimony “sends a chill up the spine,” Chomsky letter to Morrissey, 28 December 1989; http://educate-yourself.org/cn/morrisseycorrespondencewithnoamchomsky.shtml
105. USIA, Soviet Active Measures in the “Post-Cold War” Era, 70, 73, 75. The producer, Malte Rauch, did not respond to an inquiry from this author regarding the making of his documentary.
106. Knabe, Der diskrete Charme, 170.
107. USIA, Soviet Active Measures in the “Post-Cold War” Era, 62.
108. Segal and Segal, AIDS-die Spur führt ins Pentagon, 243. The book also contains a censorious essay on U.S. biological warfare research, titled “Biokrieg.” The author, Manuel Kiper, subsequently served as a Green Party member of the German parliament from 1994 to 1998.
109. Bohnsack comments: “Maybe he [Segal] wrote it himself, maybe the HVA did. Heaven knows, I don't have a clue.” Bohnsack letter to author, 19 January 2009.
110. Freitag, 17 May 1991; USIA, Soviet Active Measures in the “Post-Cold War” Era, 64; Gazette, 16 February 1992; Koehler, Stasi, 261.
111. Gordon Schaffer, Baby in the Bathwater: Memories of a Political Journalist (Sussex: Book Guild, 1996), 240, 244; Schaffer was London correspondent of the Patriot. See also the MLPD newspaper Rote Fahne, 30 December 2004.
112. USIA, Soviet Active Measures in the “Post-Cold War” Era, 66.
113. Peta Thornycroft, “Mugabe Highlights HIV/AIDS Crisis in Zimbabwe,” Voice of America News, 5 December 2006; New York Times, 10 December 2004. Maathai subsequently said her words were taken out of context, but the African journalist who first reported her remarks stood by his original report.
114. Laura M. Bogart, Seth C. Kalichman, Leikness C. Simbayi, letter to the editor, “Endorsement of a Genocidal HIV Conspiracy as a Barrier to HIV Testing in South Africa,” Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiencies 49, no. 1 (1 September 2008): 115f.
115. Ted Goertzel, “Belief in Conspiracy Theories,” Political Psychology 15, no. 4 (December 1994): 731-33; Anita M. Waters, “Conspiracy Theories as Ethnosociologies: Explanation and Intention in African American Political Culture,” Journal of Black Studies 28, no. 1 (September 1997): 117; Laura M. Bogart and Sheryl Thorburn, “Are HIV/AIDS Conspiracy Beliefs a Barrier to HIV Prevention Among African Americans?” Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes 38, no. 2 (February 1, 2005): 215.
116. Goertzel, “Belief in Conspiracy Theories,” 740.
117. Kruse, Aids, 3.
118. Cf. Patricia A. Turner, I Heard It through the Grapevine: Rumor in African-American Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 156, dismissing a statement by the CIA’s Coordinator for Academic Affairs Arthur S. Hulnick, who wrote her on 23 August 1988 that his agency believed rumors linking the CIA to AIDS were the result of Soviet disinformation.
119. Vedantam, “Persistence of Myths,” Washington Post, 4 September 2007.
120. For an analysis of rumor dynamics, see Robert H. Knapp, “A Psychology of Rumor,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 8, no. 1 (Spring 1944): especially 26f on the importance of sub-groups.
Авторы и источники:
Автор текста: Томас Богарт/Thomas Boghardt (Доктор исторических наук, Оксфордский университет)
Источник: Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009
Автор перевода: Александр Стихин
NB. Перевод текста осуществлен в исследовательских целях.