Пополнение библиотеки: Тирпиц вкратце
Добавил в библиотеку ссылку на текст Рольфа Хобсона: The Grerman Schooll of Naval Thoght anf the Origins of the Tirpitz Plan 1875-1900. Если Вам некогда читать прекрасную биографию Тирпица от Патрика Келли, а узнать, почему тезка Мэхэна (никогда не замечал - а символично же) делал то, что делал, хочется - статья Хобсона поможет. Рекомендую.
Работа эта посвящена не столько тому, что из себя представляли идеи немецких флотостроителей, столько тому, как эти идеи формировались - и почему одни приживались, а другие отмирали. Вы не узнаете (к сожалению), что именно представляли из себя "Двенадцать тактических вопросов" Лео фон Каприви, зато встретите более чем интересный комментарий сразу после упоминания соответствующей истории:
Caprivi led the way in building a bridge between tactical doctrines and manoeuvres, on the one hand, and battle tactics, on the other. In 1888, shortly before he stepped down from the Admiralty, he circulated his Twelve Tactical Questions within the officer corps. The responses summed up much of the experience gained as a result of fifteen years of work on the systematic development of tactics.
The further development of battle tactics owed much to the methodical work carried out by the Torpedo Section, which was founded in 1877 and led for twelve years by Korvettenkapitän Alfred Tirpitz. The Torpedo Section pioneered a scientific approach towards resolving specific problems. It would test a theoretical solution in experiments and exercises; this process of trial and error resulted in practical applications of doctrine that came as closely as possible to reproducing war conditions. By the end of the 1880s squadron tactics had begun to emerge as a by-product of the work of the so-called torpedo gang. The evolution of German tactical thought had reached a point where it fitted neatly into the concepts of the emerging ship-of-the-Iine school.
A caveat must be entered here. The obsession with the decisive battle on the high seas between fleets organized in squadrons of battleships acting in accordance with clearly defined and tested tactical doctrine - an obsession that was to grip all major navies during the 1890s - was not the end resuit of a long process of practical experimentation or the attempt to solve concrete strategic problems. It was derived from a completely different source.
According to Maltzahn. the concept of the decisive battle on the high seas between fleets of battleships owed more to gut feeling or abstract speculation than to the practical experience gained by navies during the decades of rapid technological change." Herbert Rosinski, who was in an unrivalled position to compare German naval thought with that of other countries, stated later that the special circumstances of the Imperial Navy's early years led it to develop a "peculiar deductive approach" to the study of naval warfare. As we shall see below, German theoreticians were not alone in adopting certain abstract principles or "laws" drawn from the study of land warfare. But their deductive approach did mislead them "into pressing naval warfare into a conceptual framework evolved out of the totally different conditions obtaining on land, or else into purely abstract discussions and distinctions which gave their work a strange atmosphere of unreality."
Хобсон не останавливается на констатации факта, он пытается дать объяснение любви немецких ВМ-мыслителей к чистой теории - и находит это объяснение в том, что немцы слишком рано (1872) создали военно-морскую академию:
The early professionalization of higher education in the Imperial Navy was probably the most important factor contributing to the propagation of abstract, axiomatic theories of naval warfare; and their insistence on the pivotal role of the decisive battle facilitated the rise of the proponents of a big battlefleet.
Далее, Хобсон уделяет немало внимания влиянию Клаузевица на немецкий флот и его теории, сопровождая исследования не лишёнными иронии комментариями:
Now, there is nothing exceptional about a nineteenth-century German officer from a patriotic Prussian family reading and quoting Clausewitz.''' Even if Tirpitz had never heard of him before, he would have received a full dose of his maxims for two hours each week when he attended Stenzel's (compulsory) lectures at the Marine-Akademie. In this respect he was a typical representative of the Prussian school of naval thought: whatever intellectual activity there was in the navy during its first twenty years drew its inspiration from the Prussian army and Clausewitz and not, to any noticeable degree, from foreign sources such as the emerging Blue Water school or the Jeune ecole.
Рассматривая переломный момент превращения немецкого флота из военного инструмента, призванного решить конкретные задачи в случае войны с Францией и Россией, в инструмент политический, призванный служить идее превращения Германии в "великую державу", Хобсон заходит достаточно далеко - туда, где упоминаются социал-дарвинизм, империализм, расизм и фашизм.
Выводы в отношении Тирпица остаются теми же, что сделал Келли - и, в конечном итоге, такие выводы являются единственно возможными при попытке обяъснить политику Тирпица, не считая оного дураком: основной движущей силой для него были соображения ведомственные, "институциональные" в терминологии Хобсона. Который не стесняется брутальной формулировки:
The operational doctrines of Service Memorandum IX precisely defined the conditions under which the strategic offensive should be undertaken if it was to serve a meaningful military purpose. The objectives of the ideology of sea power, on the other hand, were unlimited and undefinable. It provided a rationale for an imperialist foreign policy of expansion without object;'" and in domestic politics it served the militarism of a naval establishment that sought continuously to extend its control over men and resources. There are therefore strong grounds for suspecting that an institutional motive lay behind the enthusiastic adoption of the ideology of sea power
История создания "второго флота мира", основной задачей которого было нанесение "неприемлемого ущерба" флоту первому, стала чрезвычайно актуальной в эти неспокойные дни. Тирпиц остаётся фигурой, популярной у отечественных мореманов. Посему, считаю, вспомнить работу Хобсона сегодня - не можно, а нужно.
Работа эта посвящена не столько тому, что из себя представляли идеи немецких флотостроителей, столько тому, как эти идеи формировались - и почему одни приживались, а другие отмирали. Вы не узнаете (к сожалению), что именно представляли из себя "Двенадцать тактических вопросов" Лео фон Каприви, зато встретите более чем интересный комментарий сразу после упоминания соответствующей истории:
Caprivi led the way in building a bridge between tactical doctrines and manoeuvres, on the one hand, and battle tactics, on the other. In 1888, shortly before he stepped down from the Admiralty, he circulated his Twelve Tactical Questions within the officer corps. The responses summed up much of the experience gained as a result of fifteen years of work on the systematic development of tactics.
The further development of battle tactics owed much to the methodical work carried out by the Torpedo Section, which was founded in 1877 and led for twelve years by Korvettenkapitän Alfred Tirpitz. The Torpedo Section pioneered a scientific approach towards resolving specific problems. It would test a theoretical solution in experiments and exercises; this process of trial and error resulted in practical applications of doctrine that came as closely as possible to reproducing war conditions. By the end of the 1880s squadron tactics had begun to emerge as a by-product of the work of the so-called torpedo gang. The evolution of German tactical thought had reached a point where it fitted neatly into the concepts of the emerging ship-of-the-Iine school.
A caveat must be entered here. The obsession with the decisive battle on the high seas between fleets organized in squadrons of battleships acting in accordance with clearly defined and tested tactical doctrine - an obsession that was to grip all major navies during the 1890s - was not the end resuit of a long process of practical experimentation or the attempt to solve concrete strategic problems. It was derived from a completely different source.
According to Maltzahn. the concept of the decisive battle on the high seas between fleets of battleships owed more to gut feeling or abstract speculation than to the practical experience gained by navies during the decades of rapid technological change." Herbert Rosinski, who was in an unrivalled position to compare German naval thought with that of other countries, stated later that the special circumstances of the Imperial Navy's early years led it to develop a "peculiar deductive approach" to the study of naval warfare. As we shall see below, German theoreticians were not alone in adopting certain abstract principles or "laws" drawn from the study of land warfare. But their deductive approach did mislead them "into pressing naval warfare into a conceptual framework evolved out of the totally different conditions obtaining on land, or else into purely abstract discussions and distinctions which gave their work a strange atmosphere of unreality."
Хобсон не останавливается на констатации факта, он пытается дать объяснение любви немецких ВМ-мыслителей к чистой теории - и находит это объяснение в том, что немцы слишком рано (1872) создали военно-морскую академию:
The early professionalization of higher education in the Imperial Navy was probably the most important factor contributing to the propagation of abstract, axiomatic theories of naval warfare; and their insistence on the pivotal role of the decisive battle facilitated the rise of the proponents of a big battlefleet.
Далее, Хобсон уделяет немало внимания влиянию Клаузевица на немецкий флот и его теории, сопровождая исследования не лишёнными иронии комментариями:
Now, there is nothing exceptional about a nineteenth-century German officer from a patriotic Prussian family reading and quoting Clausewitz.''' Even if Tirpitz had never heard of him before, he would have received a full dose of his maxims for two hours each week when he attended Stenzel's (compulsory) lectures at the Marine-Akademie. In this respect he was a typical representative of the Prussian school of naval thought: whatever intellectual activity there was in the navy during its first twenty years drew its inspiration from the Prussian army and Clausewitz and not, to any noticeable degree, from foreign sources such as the emerging Blue Water school or the Jeune ecole.
Рассматривая переломный момент превращения немецкого флота из военного инструмента, призванного решить конкретные задачи в случае войны с Францией и Россией, в инструмент политический, призванный служить идее превращения Германии в "великую державу", Хобсон заходит достаточно далеко - туда, где упоминаются социал-дарвинизм, империализм, расизм и фашизм.
Выводы в отношении Тирпица остаются теми же, что сделал Келли - и, в конечном итоге, такие выводы являются единственно возможными при попытке обяъснить политику Тирпица, не считая оного дураком: основной движущей силой для него были соображения ведомственные, "институциональные" в терминологии Хобсона. Который не стесняется брутальной формулировки:
The operational doctrines of Service Memorandum IX precisely defined the conditions under which the strategic offensive should be undertaken if it was to serve a meaningful military purpose. The objectives of the ideology of sea power, on the other hand, were unlimited and undefinable. It provided a rationale for an imperialist foreign policy of expansion without object;'" and in domestic politics it served the militarism of a naval establishment that sought continuously to extend its control over men and resources. There are therefore strong grounds for suspecting that an institutional motive lay behind the enthusiastic adoption of the ideology of sea power
История создания "второго флота мира", основной задачей которого было нанесение "неприемлемого ущерба" флоту первому, стала чрезвычайно актуальной в эти неспокойные дни. Тирпиц остаётся фигурой, популярной у отечественных мореманов. Посему, считаю, вспомнить работу Хобсона сегодня - не можно, а нужно.